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Glossary of Abbreviations 
 
AfriCOG Africa Centre for Open Governance 
CID  Criminal Investigations Division  
CIPEV Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence (Waki Commission) 
CREAW  Center for Rights Education and Awareness 
DCI  Directorate of Criminal Investigations  
DPP  Director of Public Prosecutions 
EACJ  East African Court of Justice 
FIDA  Federation of Women Lawyers 
GHRC  Genesis for Human Rights Commission Mombasa 
ICA  International Crimes Act  
ICC  International Criminal Court  
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICJ-Kenya Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists 
ICTJ  International Center for Transitional Justice  
IDP  Internally displaced person 
IO  Investigating officer 
KANU  Kenya African National Union  
KEJUDE Kenyans for Justice and Development 
KHRC  Kenya Human Rights Commission 
KNCHR  Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
KNDR  Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
KTN  Kenya Television Network 
MP  Member of Parliament 
NGO  Nongovernmental organization  
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OCS  Officer Commanding Station  
ODM  Orange Democratic Movement  
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
PEV   Post-election violence  
PNU  Party of National Unity 
SBGV  Sexual and gender-based violence  
SLDF  Sabaot Land Defence Force 
TJRC  Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
WKLS  Western Kenya Law Society  
 




We are very good at saying we don’t leave a single stone unturned, but we 
don’t turn a single stone. Maybe we turn pebbles.… Small stones are turned. 
The big ones, no one dares. 
—Kalenjin elder, on the lack of justice following post-election violence, 
Eldoret, May 27, 2011  
 
Four years after the onset of Kenya’s 2007-2008 post-election violence—and with a new 
election campaign underway—Kenya’s government has done little to provide justice to 
victims. The government has failed to ensure the prosecution of perpetrators in all but a 
handful of the 1,133 or more killings committed during the violence, which pitted ruling 
party supporters and the police against opposition-linked armed groups and civilians. 
Victims of rape, assault, arson, and other crimes similarly await justice. 
 
The Office of the Attorney General, through the Department of Public Prosecutions, has 
compiled lists of thousands of cases allegedly linked to the election violence, ranging from 
petty theft and rioting to rape and murder. But despite efforts to prioritize and act on 
serious cases in the immediate aftermath of the violence, there have been few prosecutions 
and fewer convictions, as well as a near total lack of investigations of those who organized 
and financed the violence. Hundreds of inquest files literally gather dust in police stations.  
 
The Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence (CIPEV, also known as the Waki 
Commission after its president, Justice Philip Waki), which was formed in the wake of the 
violence, conducted preliminary investigations and recommended establishing a special 
tribunal, with a mandate to try the persons alleged to be most responsible for the violence. 
In December 2008 President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga signed an 
agreement to establish the tribunal and implement the Waki recommendations in full. But 
the Kenyan government and parliament have since largely disregarded this commitment.  
 
The parliament and the cabinet shot down several proposals in 2009 to establish a special 
tribunal. Some parliamentarians said they rejected the bills because they preferred to see 
crimes against humanity tried at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. Some 
of those same parliamentarians later hypocritically called on Kenya to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute establishing the ICC. Kibaki suggested that the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), formed after the violence, could provide accountability. 
But while the commission has held hearings to elicit information about the violence, it is 
not a judicial mechanism and cannot prosecute suspects.  
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The ICC opened investigations into the post-election violence in March 2010. Kenya 
repeatedly promised to cooperate with the investigations. However, when the ICC 
prosecutor requested summons for six high-profile political and opinion leaders in 
December 2010 the government balked, opting for a series of political and legal acrobatics 
to try to postpone or prevent prosecutions.  
 
Cases against the six high-profile suspects advanced at the ICC despite the attempts to 
block them. As “the first institution [Kenyan politicians] have come across that they cannot 
bribe, kill, or intimidate,” in the words of one Kenyan activist, the ICC is the focus of many 
victims’ hope for justice. 
 
But hundreds of other perpetrators of serious crimes continue to evade accountability. A 
few have been convicted for serious crimes. A report prepared by the Department of Public 
Prosecutions in March 2011 claimed that 94 post-election cases had resulted in 
convictions. But Human Rights Watch found that only a small percentage of those 
convictions were for serious crimes that were actually related to the election violence, 
including two for murder, three for “robbery with violence” (one of the most serious crimes 
under Kenya’s penal code, which can encompass robberies resulting in the death of the 
victim), one for assault, and one for grievous harm.  
 
The limited success of cases in the ordinary courts shows that Kenyan authorities have 
been unwilling or unable to effectively prosecute post-election violence. In Uasin Gishu 
district, for instance, an epicenter of turbulence, no one has been convicted for at least 
230 killings. The fact that not a single police officer has been convicted for shootings or 
rapes directly related to the post-election violence, despite an estimated 962 police 
shootings, 405 of them fatal, and dozens of reported rapes by police, also demonstrates 
the extent of impunity for certain groups that appear to be protected.  
 
Lack of political will to address post-election violence is further demonstrated by 
government failure to adequately compensate victims—including at least 21 victims of 
police gunshots who filed, and won, civil suits claiming damages. When courts awarded 
them compensation, the government failed to pay up.  
 
The ICC is a court of last resort and is likely to prosecute only a handful of those 
responsible for the crimes within its jurisdiction—which covers genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity—in any given situation. Additional investigations and 
prosecutions are needed in Kenya to widen accountability for the post-election violence.  
 
       5       HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | DECEMBER 2011 
This report, based on interviews with victims of the post-election violence, police officers, 
defense and prosecution lawyers, judges, local officials, civil society organizations and 
others, and analysis of 76 court files, documents the difficulties faced by election violence 
victims in obtaining access to justice in Kenya. It identifies the principal weaknesses 
within the criminal justice system that have contributed to the paltry number of 
convictions, including police officers’ unwillingness to investigate and prosecute their 
colleagues; the poor quality of investigations in general; incompetence on the part of 
some police prosecutors; political influence and corruption to subvert the judicial process; 
and the absence of an operative witness protection system.  
 
Given concerns about the independence and competence of the Kenyan justice system, 
and the evidence documented in this report, the CIPEV’s recommendation for a special 
tribunal remains relevant and urgent. Human Rights Watch calls on the Kenyan government 
to establish special mechanisms within the Kenyan judicial system to investigate and 
prosecute the most serious election-related crimes, either as international crimes or as 
serious ordinary crimes. Cases against lower-level perpetrators or for less serious crimes 
could be dealt with through either a special mechanism or the ordinary courts.  
 
Kenya’s police and judicial sectors should also learn from the past and make necessary 
reforms. Numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and independent commissions, 
including the CIPEV, have recommended reforms that are now commonly agreed upon as 
necessary. Among those that appear most urgent in light of failed prosecution of election 
violence are: improving police investigations capacity; replacing police prosecutors with 
legal professionals; and vetting police, excluding from service those known to have 
committed human rights abuses.  
 
The government should immediately provide full funding to the existing Witness Protection 
Agency and ensure that it is robust, credible, and has the option of relocating at-risk, high-
value witnesses outside Kenya. The Witness Protection Agency will have to prove itself 
before many election violence witnesses are willing to testify in court. Its activation should 
be an urgent priority.  
 
Under international law, Kenya has an obligation to prosecute serious international crimes, 
and all victims of such crimes have the right to an effective remedy and access to justice.  
Providing redress for post-election violence victims is a requirement, not an option. Nearly 
four years after the violence, victims have been waiting for justice for far too long. 




On Establishing a Special Mechanism to Prosecute Post-Election Violence 
To the Parliament of Kenya 
• Establish a special mechanism or mechanisms, such as a special division within the 
High Court of Kenya and a special investigatory unit, to investigate, prosecute, and 
adjudicate post-election violence cases. 
• Appoint international and Kenyan judges to the special mechanism. 
• Form a special appeals panel within the Court of Appeals that will hear appeals arising 
from the special mechanism.  
• Ensure that the mandate of the special mechanism includes: 
o Constituting investigative and prosecutorial teams composed of Kenyan and 
international members; and, 
o Establishing a specific unit to investigate police shootings and excessive use of 
force, as well as police negligence, during the post-election violence. 
• Ensure that high-value witnesses to the special mechanism benefit from witness 
protection. 
• Provide full funding for the special mechanism. 
• Pass legislation to establish the position of special prosecutor, to lead prosecutions at 
the special mechanism to try cases of post-election violence. 
 
To International Donors in the Justice Sector, including Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, The United Kingdom, Norway, The United States, 
the European Commission, the United Nations Development Programme, and the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
• Closely monitor steps to establish a special mechanism to prosecute post-election 
violence in Kenya. Consider offering support, including training, human resources 
support, and financing, on the condition that the mechanism is credible, independent, 
and capable of protecting witnesses. 
 
To the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
• Closely monitor steps to establish a special mechanism to prosecute post-election 
violence in Kenya. Consider sharing evidence and offering support, including training, 
on the condition that the mechanism is credible, independent, and capable of 
protecting witnesses and that Kenya demonstrates continued cooperation with the ICC. 
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On Further Steps to Address Impunity for Post-Election Violence and Improve 
Access to Justice 
To the Government of Kenya 
• Fully fund and make operational the existing Witness Protection Agency. 
• Allocate the Directorate of Public Prosecutions sufficient funds to hire new civilian 
prosecutors and to train select well-performing police prosecutors to join the State Law 
Office. 
• Comply with court orders in civil cases providing for compensation to victims. 
• Establish a national reparations program to provide reparations for victims of human 
rights violations. 
 
To the Kenya National Police 
• Publicly release the results of any internal inquiries conducted into police conduct 
during the post-election violence.  
• If such investigations have not been conducted, commence internal investigations 
against police officers and units suspected of violations, including those adversely 
mentioned in the Waki Report and the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights 
report. Suspend police who are found to be guilty of misconduct, and prosecute those 
suspected of crimes. 
• Ensure that the planned police vetting process provide civilians the chance to bring 
complaints against individual police officers, and that such complaints are taken into 
consideration in decisions on hiring and firing. 
• Strengthen training on investigations for members of the newly established Directorate 
of Criminal Investigation. 
 
To the Director of Public Prosecutions 
• Request additional funds for at least 400 new civilian prosecutors. 
• Allow private prosecutions by individuals and civil society organizations wishing to 
prosecute cases of post-election violence. 
 
To Parliament 
• Investigate allegations that corruption and political pressure influenced the attorney 
general’s filing of nolle prosequis (motions to withdraw charges) in post-election 
violence cases. 
• Amend Section 21 of the Government Proceedings Act so that it no longer prevents 
enforcement of judgments against the government. 
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To Parliament and President Kibaki  
• Ensure that anyone suspected of complicity in the post-election violence or other 
serious human rights abuses is not appointed to the new position of inspector general 
of police. 
 
To Parliament and the Finance Ministry 
• Ensure that sufficient funds are budgeted to the Directorate of Public Prosecutions for 
the hiring of 400 new civilian prosecutors. 
 
To the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
• Recommend the investigation of high and mid-level perpetrators in the post-election 
violence named before the commission.  
• Recommend that the government pay all civil damages awarded by courts in election 
violence related cases. 
• Order reparations for victims of post-election violence. 
 




Human Rights Watch conducted research between February and November 2011 into the 
status of national investigations and prosecutions for the 2007-2008 post-election 
violence in Nairobi, Rift Valley, Western, Nyanza, and Coast provinces—the provinces most 
affected by the violence. The primary aim of the research was to assess to what extent 
victims have been able to access justice for post-election violence and to identify 
obstacles that they encountered. 
 
Human Rights Watch researchers interviewed 172 people, including 75 victims of post-
election violence, focusing on those that tried to bring a complaint at the time of the 
violence; those involved in court cases that went forward; or those that recognized 
perpetrators and would be willing to testify. Researchers also interviewed police, 
prosecutors, defense lawyers, magistrates, judicial officials, local administrative officials, 
and local civil society actors concerning the specific challenges to access to justice in each 
location and in particular cases.  
 
Researchers consulted 76 court files in Bungoma, Butere, Eldoret, Kakamega, Kericho, 
Kitale, Molo, Mombasa, Nairobi, Naivasha, Nakuru, Sotik, and Webuye. They particularly 
focused on high-profile cases involving politicians, police, businesspeople, or other 
influential citizens and cases involving serious charges, such as murder, robbery with 
violence, rape, defilement, and assault causing actual bodily harm.  
 
Human Rights Watch submitted a letter to the commissioner of police on June 7, 2011, 
requesting information on recent progress in investigations, if any; the outcome of any 
internal investigations into the conduct of the police during the post-election violence; and 
whether police investigations into sexual offenses during the post-election violence had 
resulted in any prosecutions (see Appendix II). The same letter was delivered to the 
Criminal Investigations Division (CID) of the police on July 13, 2011. Human Rights Watch, 
in the same letter and in subsequent phone calls, requested meetings with the police 
commissioner and the director of the CID to seek their views on the issues raised in this 
report, in the interests of ensuring fairness and balance. Despite promises from the deputy 
police spokesperson, as of this writing, no response had been received.  
 
Many of the interviews were conducted in English; others were conducted in Swahili, 
Kikuyu, Kipsigis, Nandi, Dholuo, Luhya, or Sabaot, with the assistance of interpreters.  
 
The names of those officials who spoke on condition of anonymity, and of victims and 
witnesses who feared repercussions, have been withheld or replaced with pseudonyms.
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I. Background: Cycles of Violence and Impunity 
 
Political violence in Kenya, along with excessive use of force by security agencies, neither 
began nor ended with the 2007-2008 post-election violence. The response has been 
consistent both before and after the elections: impunity, spotted with occasional promises 
by the authorities to set up investigative commissions. Such commissions have rarely 
been effective: they fail to publish reports, or produce reports that conceal rather than 
reveal, and when they do conduct serious investigations, their recommendations are 
largely disregarded. 
 
Post-independence Kenya’s reputation across the globe as relatively stable and peaceful 
is not supported by the country’s political history. The series of political assassinations 
that took place under President Jomo Kenyatta’s post-independence regime, from 1963 to 
1978, was never seriously investigated. Under Daniel arap Moi, Kenyatta’s successor, 
hundreds of political opponents were tortured, and despite several court decisions 
awarding victims compensation, no one was prosecuted for the abuses.1 Moi’s regime was 
also known for excessive use of force by the state security apparatus. It committed abuses 
that may amount to crimes against humanity, as in the case of the 1985 Wagalla Massacre, 
in which hundreds if not thousands of ethnic Somalis were killed during an operation to 
seize weapons.2  
 
After Moi agreed under diplomatic pressure to hold multi-party elections in 1992, 
organized groups affiliated with Moi’s party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), 
incited violence against members of the Kikuyu ethnic group in the Rift Valley, where 
Kikuyus were suspected of supporting the nascent opposition. KANU supporters rallied 
Kalenjin residents3 around the idea that Kikuyus were “non-indigenous” and had 
appropriated Kalenjin land.4 They attacked Kikuyus before the elections, to push them out 
and ensure the maximum number of Moi votes, and after the elections, to solidify claims 
                                                          
1 Some victims have been compensated, but only after being “forced … to engage in further court and protracted political 
action to have the monies released.” Kenya Human Rights Commission, “Surviving After Torture: A Case Digest on the 
Struggle for Justice by Torture Survivors in Kenya,” 2009, pp. 42, 85-86. 
2 Billow Kerrow, “The Wagalla Massacre Was a Crime Against Humanity,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), February 9, 2010, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201002091141.html (accessed July 19, 2011); “Kenya: Wagalla massacre survivors testify,” April 
18, 2011, BBC News Online, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13123813 (accessed November 1, 2011).  
3 The term “Kalenjin” is a colonial-era construction grouping together at least 10 distinct Nilotic ethnic groups that share 
linguistic and cultural traditions. The largest among them are the Kipsigis and the Nandi. 
4 Land conflict in the Rift Valley has roots in the colonial area, when British settlers expropriated land from Kalenjins. After 
independence, President Kenyatta’s regime facilitated the transfer of some of this land to Kikuyus.  
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on their land.5 In 1992 a parliamentary committee investigated the violence and found that 
779 people had been killed and 56,000 families rendered homeless. The committee’s 
report named several dozen senior and mid-level political figures, including cabinet 
members, members of parliament, local councilors, and chiefs, who had organized and 
funded the attacks. They were never held accountable, and violence continued.6 Human 
Rights Watch estimated that between October 1991 and November 1993, 1,500 Kenyans 
were killed and 300,000 displaced.7 
 
Violence in the Rift Valley, most often in the form of attacks by Kalenjin and Maasai groups 
seeking to evict Kikuyus from their land, continued sporadically throughout the mid-1990s, 
killing dozens and displacing thousands.8 After a second round of multiparty elections in 
1997, groups affiliated with KANU again attacked suspected opposition supporters in the 
Rift Valley and in Coast province—in many cases with police complicity. Kikuyu groups 
carried out reprisal attacks.9  
 
In 1998 the president established the Akiwumi commission, tasked with investigating 
“tribal clashes” from 1991 to 1998. The commission’s 1999 report was only made public in 
October 2002 after a legal battle. It confirmed that prominent ruling party politicians had 
fueled multiple incidents of so-called ethnic clashes in Kenya since 1991, and had 
sabotaged attempts to investigate these incidents. One hundred and eighty nine people 
were “adversely mentioned” in the report, including current president Mwai Kibaki and 
current internal security minister George Saitoti, both members of parliament at the time.10 
                                                          
5 Election observers found that the elections themselves were marked by irregularities, vote-buying, and the lack of an even 
playing field. See, for instance, International Republican Institute, “Kenya: The December 29, 1992 Elections,” 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/Kenya%27s%201992%20Presidential,%20Parliamentary%20and%20Local%20Electi
ons.pdf.  
6 Republic of Kenya, Kenya National Assembly, “Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in 
Western and Other Parts of Kenya,” September 1992, Nairobi Kenya. The report cited Jackson Kibor, a Kalenjin elder charged with 
incitement to violence during the 2008 post-election violence, as having also instigated ethnic violence in 1992; see p. 52.  
7 Africa Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Africa), Kenya – Divide and Rule: State Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya, 
November 1993, pp. 1, 98-102.  
8 Africa Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Africa), Kenya – Multipartism Betrayed in Kenya: Continuing Rural Violence and 
Restrictions on Freedom of Speech and Assembly, 1994, p. 2 
9 Amnesty International, “Kenya: Political Violence Spirals,” June 10, 1998, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR32/019/1998/en/67dd2c7e-daa5-11dd-80bc-
797022e51902/afr320191998en.pdf (accessed July 19, 2011). 
10 The Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Tribal Clashes in Kenya (The Akiwumi report), “List of 
persons adversely mentioned and notified,” is available at 
http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/pdfs/2008/jan_08/Judicial_Commission_Report_On_Tribal_Clashes_In_Kenya/List_Of_Pe
rsons_Adversely_Mentioned.pdf (accessed September 13, 2011). Henry Kosgey, current MP and suspect before the ICC, is 
also cited in the Akiwumi report as having played a role in stoking ethnic tensions in the Rift Valley; see pp. 10, 54 of the 
chapter on the Rift Valley, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Akiwumi.Rift%20Valley.pdf. 
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No one was prosecuted on the basis of the report.11 In 2008 Attorney General Amos Wako 
told the CIPEV that he had directed the police to carry out investigations but that he had no 
power to enforce this request, a claim that the commission challenged since the 
constitution in effect at the time required the police to comply with requests from the 
attorney general.12 
 
Given this context of well-established impunity for political crimes, it is no surprise that 
politicians believed that they could get away with virtually anything in order to achieve 
their political ends, both before and after the 2007 elections.  
 
Empowered by Impunity: The 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence 
Human Rights Watch documented the 2007-2008 post-election violence in the 2008 report 
Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance. 
 
Though generally referred to as “post-election” violence, politically motivated attacks 
began before the December 2007 elections. The European Union election observer mission 
documented 34 election-related deaths between August and December 2007.13 In Mt. 
Elgon region, Western Province, by far the greatest number of politically motivated killings 
during the pre-election period was perpetrated by the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF), a 
militia group that killed over 730 people between 2006 and 2008. SLDF attacks took on 
increasingly political overtones in the run-up to the election, with militiamen targeting 
officials associated with Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) and civilians who were seen 
as unlikely to support the SLDF’s favored candidates from the opposition Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM).14  
 
Elections took place on December 27. On December 30, the Electoral Board announced 
Kibaki as the winner over ODM candidate Raila Odinga. Kibaki’s victory was widely 
regarded by Kenyans as the result of rigging, provoking protests and riots throughout the 
country. The government responded with excessive police force, killing and wounding 
hundreds of demonstrators and raping women and girls in opposition strongholds.15  
                                                          
11 A Kenyan NGO, Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG), squarely places the blame on Wako’s shoulders for the failure 
to prosecute perpetrators of both the 1992 and 1997 episodes of violence. AfriCOG notes that the Criminal Investigations 
Department of the Kenyan police forwarded cases to the attorney general’s office for prosecution, but they were never taken 
up. AfriCOG, “Poisoned Legacy,” August 2011, p. 11. 
12 Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election 
Violence,” October 16, 2008, p. 449.  
13 Human Rights Watch interview with European Union election observers, Nairobi, January 8, 2008. 
14 Human Rights Watch, “Hold Your Heart”: Waiting for Justice in Kenya’s Mt. Elgon Region, October 2011, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/10/27/hold-your-heart, pp. 41-43. 
15 Statistics suggest the police may be responsible for more killings than any other single group. 
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In the Rift Valley, mobilized ODM supporters killed hundreds of Kikuyus, Kisiis, and other 
suspected PNU supporters, including Kalenjins. Several hundred thousand people were 
driven from their homes. Many attacks were highly organized.16 In some cases, local 
politicians coordinated and funded Kalenjin militias, and a popular radio show broadcast 
messages inciting violence against Kikuyus and naming locations to be attacked.17  
 
PNU supporters mobilized in response to the attacks. One response was allegedly to 
activate the Mungiki, a Kikuyu politico-religious militia and criminal gang that the Kenyan 
government banned in 2002, but that some political leaders continued to collaborate 
with.18 Retaliatory attacks against perceived ODM supporters in and around Nakuru and 
Naivasha towns during the last week of January 2008 allegedly resulted in over 200 
killings, along with a number of cases of rape, forced displacement, forced circumcision, 
penile amputation, and other serious crimes.19 
 
All in all, according to the Waki commission, 1,133 persons were killed in the violence 
between December 27, 2007 and the end of February 2008.20 A total of at least 663,921 
were internally displaced.21 The signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act by 
PNU and ODM leaders on February 28, 2008, which created a coalition government with 
Kibaki as president and Odinga as prime minister, brought the violence to an end in much 
of the country.  
 
Not all election-related violence ceased, however. Waki Commission statistics leave out a 
further round of atrocities, those committed by the armed forces in Mt. Elgon district in 
March and April 2008. The SLDF militia, which favored several ODM candidates and 
intimidated the population to vote for them, had already carried out murder and other 
atrocities on a massive scale in lead-up to elections. In March 2008 the Kenyan authorities 
initiated a joint military-police operation known as Operation Okoa Maisha (“Save Lives” 
in Swahili) to root out the SLDF. Several thousand suspected SLDF supporters, including 
boys as young as 10, were tortured. Several hundred were forcibly disappeared. This 
                                                          
16 Human Rights Watch interview with a former member of the Waki Commission, Nairobi, May 3, 2011.  
17 International Criminal Court, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey 
and Joshua arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11, “Document Containing the Charges”; Human Rights Watch interviews with Kalenjin 
youth, Rift Valley province, August 2011. 
18 One historian describes Mungiki as a “criminal gang and private militia … [that] has its roots in a Kikuyu cultural revival 
movement dating back to the 1990s but rose to prominence during the summer of 2007 with a series of grisly beheadings of 
criminal rivals.” Daniel Branch, “At the Polling Station in Kibera,” London Review of Books, vol. 30, no. 2, January 24, 2008.   
19 International Criminal Court, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Document Containing the Charges, August 19, 2011, ICC-
01/09-02/1-257/AnxA. 
20 CIPEV, p. 383. 
21 Republic of Kenya, Office of the President, Ministry of State for Special Programmes, “Progress Report on IDP Resettlement 
as at 18th July, 2011,” (Progress Report on IDP Resettlement) on file with Human Rights Watch.  
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violent episode is often considered a separate phenomenon from the post-election 
violence, but the political dynamics behind the SLDF’s targeting of civilians, and the 
government’s disproportionate, abusive response, follow the same pattern as seen 
elsewhere during Kenya’s post-election violence.22 As in post-election violence elsewhere 
in the country, only a handful of suspects—and no members of the security forces—have 
been prosecuted for crimes in Mt. Elgon. 
 
Ongoing Abuses  
Several incidents that occurred after the post-election violence suggest that in spite of 
additional scrutiny in the wake of the violence, impunity continues to fuel abuses by 
politicians and members of the security forces. The outcry over the violence was not 
enough to stem abuses in the absence of accountability.  
 
Crimes attributed to members of the security agencies that have not resulted in 
investigations or prosecutions include, among others, the October 2008 killing of police 
whistleblower Bernard Kiriinya, who had provided the Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights (KNCHR) with information on the activities of police death squads, and the 
March 2009 killings of human rights activists Oscar Kamau King’ara and John Paul Oulu.23 
Witnesses, victims’ families, and civil society organizations continue to accuse members 
of the Kenyan police of extrajudicial killings, but police are rarely investigated on the basis 
of such accusations.24 
 
Civil society activists interviewed by Human Rights Watch could not recall a single case in 
which a senior politician had ever been convicted of a serious crime in Kenya, despite an 
endless stream of allegations of criminal behavior. In the last two years, at least five 
prominent politicians have been forced to step down or “step aside” after being charged in 
high-profile corruption cases, but not one has been convicted.25  
                                                          
22 Human Rights Watch, “Hold Your Heart”, pp. 41-43. 
23 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), “The Testimony of the late Bernard Kiriinya on Extrajudicial 
Executions and Disappearances,” February 24, 2009, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=65107219576 (accessed 
November 27, 2011); “Kenya: Killing of Activists Needs Independent Inquiry,” Human Rights Watch news release, March 6, 
2009, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/03/06/kenya-killing-activists-needs-independent-inquiry; see also “UN urges probe 
into Kenya murders,” BBC News Online, March 6, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7927873.stm (accessed 
September 1, 2011). 
24 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Seventeenth session, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, Addendum, Follow-up county recommendations – Kenya,” 
April 26, 2011, A/HRC/17/28/Add.4. The report finds, “The rate of investigations and prosecution of police killing remains 
unacceptably low.” 
25 These include: former Minister of Industry Henry Kosgey, who resigned from his ministerial post (but remains in Parliament) 
in January 2011; former Minister of Foreign Affairs Moses Wetang’ula, and Permanent Secretary Thuita Mwangi, who stepped 
down in October 2010; former Nairobi mayor Geoffrey Majiwa; and William Ruto, who was suspended from his position as 
Minister of Higher Education in October 2010. Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), “Lest We Forget: The Faces of 
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Looking Abroad for Justice 
Decades of impunity have left ordinary Kenyans with a sense that the Kenyan justice 
system has repeatedly failed them.26 This frustration has led many to place their hopes in 
the International Criminal Court as a last resort for access to justice. As expressed by the 
brother of a victim of police shooting, “I support the ICC, because we’ve already tried 
everything in Kenya, and nothing has worked.”27 Victims of rights violations in Mt. Elgon, 
for their part, have also taken cases before international bodies.28 
 
The ICC and other international judicial instances may bring a measure of accountability. 
But even as international justice takes its course, the glaring lack of accountability within 
Kenya remains unaddressed. Many Kenyans are convinced that justice within Kenya is 
necessary. A June 2011 report by South Consulting, based on a survey of 2500 Kenyans, 
found that respondents “are disillusioned by the lack of progress in arresting lower and 
middle level perpetrators and holding senior and influential people to account.”29 A 
subsequent report expressed concern that “the perception that the ICC is for ‘big people’ 
may in fact harden impunity among the low-level perpetrators unless a local deterrent 
mechanism is put in place.”30 South Consulting found Kenyans view prosecutions as a 
critical means to prevent future political violence.31 
 
So far, the Kenyan state has let them down. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Impunity in Kenya,” September 2011, p. 15; Michael Onyiego, “Kenyan President Suspends Minister Facing Major Corruption 
Charges,” Voice of America, October 20, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Kenyan-President-Suspends-
Minister-Facing-Major-Corruption-Charges--105337848.html (accessed November 27, 2011). Wetang’ula was offered a new 
ministerial post in August 2011, despite ongoing investigations into his conduct. Those who “step aside” continue to receive 
their full salary and benefits. 
26 South Consulting, “The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project, Draft Review Report,” April 
2011, http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/April2011KNDRReport.pdf (accessed September 25, 2011), pp. 8-9. 
27 Human Rights Watch interview with John Olago, brother of gunshot victim George William Onyango, Nyanza province, May 
10, 2011.  
28 These include the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) and the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances; see Human Rights Watch, “Hold Your Heart”, p. 65-67.  
29 South Consulting, “The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project,” Review Report, June 2011, 
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/June2011ReviewReport.pdf (accessed September 25, 2011), p. v.  
30 South Consulting, “The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project,” Review Report, October 
2011, http://south.co.ke/Downloads/Reports/11threviewreport.pdf (accessed November 1, 2011), p. ix.  
31 South Consulting, April 2011, p. 25. 
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II. Half-Hearted National Efforts toward Accountability 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the 2007-2008 election violence the government seemed 
willing to explore paths toward accountability. Indeed, there was tremendous pressure 
from the Kenyan population to do so, leading, ironically, to slapdash investigations and 
prosecutions that were so hurried that they resulted in acquittals.32 As one human rights 
activist put it, “The police were busy trying to arrest everyone in a hurry, so when the cases 
went to court, they didn’t have any witnesses.”33 Following these initial failures, the 
criminal justice apparatus appeared to lose momentum in handling election violence 
cases. And even these early efforts demonstrated only a limited commitment to 
investigating those who organized and financed the violence. 
 
Positions on accountability for election violence have never been uniform across the 
coalition government. Early on the PNU took a strong pro-prosecution stance, while the 
ODM favored amnesty, likely because most of those arrested in the immediate aftermath 
of the violence were affiliated with the ODM.34 Later, after the ICC prosecutor named the six 
suspects against whom he was seeking summons—which included key officials on the 
PNU side, whereas those on the ODM side were of a dissident wing that had already 
effectively split with Raila Odinga—the positions of leaders in both parties reversed. This is 
an indication of the extent to which politicians’ commitment to justice has varied based on 
shifting personal and political interests. 
 
In early 2011 the government undertook to assure the ICC that investigations in Kenya were 
advancing. But this seemed to be little more than posturing, linked to the government’s 
“admissibility challenge,” a motion filed before the ICC which sought, unsuccessfully, to 
have the cases returned to Kenyan jurisdiction.35 The government argued that Kenya was 
able and willing to prosecute post-election violence at home, rendering the ICC 
intervention unnecessary. The court rejected the government’s challenge, finding no 
evidence that Kenya was investigating the same six suspects for the same conduct for 
                                                          
32 Human Rights Watch interviews with judicial officials, Nakuru, April 2011, and with civil society activists, Eldoret, May 2011.  
33 Human Rights Watch interview with Ken Wafula, director of the NGO Council, Eldoret, May 23, 2011.  
34 South Consulting, June 2011, p. 4.  
35 Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11, “Application on behalf 
of the Government of The Republic of Kenya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute,” March 31, 2011, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1050005.pdf (accessed September 24, 2011); Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11, “Application on behalf of the Government of The Republic of Kenya 
pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute,” March 31, 2011, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1050028.pdf (accessed 
September 24, 2011). 
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which they were summoned by the ICC.36 The Kenyan investigations have not resulted in 
any new arrests in the eight months since they were allegedly initiated. 
 
Initial Caseload: Priority Cases 
In mid-2008 newly appointed Ministry of Internal Security George Saitoti drew up a list of 
cases to be treated with particular speed. According to a June 2008 news report, Saitoti 
“ordered police to speed up investigations and prosecutions of the remaining cases, and 
particularly those linked to capital and serious offences” and “directed that the cases be 
ranked according to their gravity so that suspects can be charged more quickly.”37 
Described as “priority cases” were 103 cases that were already before the courts, with 137 
suspects on remand, as of June 2008.  
 
Police have not responded to a request from Human Rights Watch for the list of priority 
cases, and the Director of Public Prosecutions told Human Rights Watch he was not aware 
of the list.38 According to a police communiqué, it included the following well-known 
“Cases of Interest,” all in Rift Valley province:39  
 
• The burning of a church at Kiambaa, Uasin Gishu district, in which at least 28 
Kikuyu were killed;40  
• The killing of Kikuyu priest, Father Michael Kamau, by a mob in Eldama Ravine;  
• The burning of a home in Naivasha, in which 19 people, mostly Luos, were killed;  
• The killing of administration police officer Hassan Omar Dado in Ainamoi;  
• The killing of former Ainamoi member of parliament David Too in Eldoret; 
• The killing of two police officers, Police Constable Peter Githinji and Administration 
Police Constable David Odiambo, in Bureti; 
• The killing of Nahashon Mburu in Molo; 
                                                          
36 Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11, “Decision on the 
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute,” 
May 30, 2011, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1078822.pdf (accessed September 24, 2011); Prosecutor v. Francis 
Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11, “Decision on the Application by the 
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute,” May 30, 2011, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1078823.pdf (accessed September 24, 2011). 
37 Fred Mukinda, “Police Won’t Free Suspects,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), June 1, 2008, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200806010004.html (accessed June 27, 2011). 
38 Human Rights Watch interview with Director of Public Prosecutions Keriako Tobiko, Nairobi, September 22, 2011.  
39 Eric Kiraithe, “Police Action on Post-Election Violence,” March 19, 2008, Kenya Police, 
http://www.kenyapolice.go.ke/News128.asp (accessed September 13, 2011); Fred Mukinda, “Police Won’t Free Suspects,” 
Daily Nation (Nairobi), June 1, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200806010004.html (accessed June 27, 2011).  
40 Reported death tolls for this incident vary. Human Rights Watch relies here on the figure established by CIPEV, p. 46. 
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• The killing of District Officer Benedict Omolo and Chief Inspector Elias Wafula 
Wakhunghu in Cheptiret district of Eldoret; and,  
• The killing of Charles Keittany Korir, a former government irrigation officer, in 
Koibatek district.  
 
By 2011, six of these nine cases had not resulted in convictions. There was one minor 
assault conviction linked to the killing of Hassan Omar Dado, but those suspected of killing 
Dado were acquitted.41 A suspect was convicted of manslaughter in the killing of David Too, 
but while that case may have been of interest in that it provoked further violence, the killing 
itself was unrelated to the elections. There were, however, convictions for the murder of the 
police officers in Bureti. Notably absent from the list of known “priority cases” are 
shootings by police officers. The proceedings and outcomes in these and other high profile 
cases are discussed in detail in Chapter III, and the police impunity, in Chapter IV, below. 
 
According to a news report, the police also drew up a list of 200 suspected organizers of 
election violence. Several of them were charged in court, but none was ever brought to trial 
and convicted.42  
 
The Department of Public Prosecutions Report of February 2009 
The Kenyan government made some initial efforts to compile nationwide statistics on post-
election violence cases, which could have fed into a special tribunal or other mechanism 
for justice. In June 2008 the attorney general instructed Director of Public Prosecutions 
Keriako Tobiko to appoint a team of State Counsel tasked with identifying all post-election 
violence cases that had been filed; determining which cases had already been concluded 
in the courts; and recommending follow-up for open cases.  
 
Working alongside officials from the police Criminal Investigation Department, the team 
produced a report that listed cases resulting in convictions, cases resulting in acquittals, 
cases withdrawn by the attorney general’s office, cases pending before the courts, cases 
pending arrest of a known suspect, cases pending under investigation (in which no known 
                                                          
41 Republic v. Francis Kipn’geno, Sammy Kosgei, Simon Ruto, Peter Biegon, Joseph Cheruiyot Sawe, Thomas Kiprotich, Peter 
Kipkoech Langat, CR 86/08, Kericho Magistrate’s Court, file consulted by Human Rights Watch, May 13, 2011; Human Rights 
Watch interviews, Kericho, August 2011. The suspects accused of killing Dado were all acquitted; Sawe, accused of 
assaulting a local chief in a related incident, was convicted of assault, but was released after paying a fine.  
42 These included ODM politician Jackson Kibor, who was charged in Nakuru with incitement, as discussed in chapter III 
below; then-Kapsabet mayor Michael Rono, councilors Paul Cheruiyot and Johnston Kirua and former councilors Ishmael 
Choge, Abid Keter, Richard Ruto and George Ruto, charged in Kapsabet with various property crimes; and former Moi 
university lecturer and businessperson Silas Simatwo, charged with financing attacks. Mukinda, “Police Won’t Free 
Suspects,” Daily Nation. 
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suspect has been identified), and inquests and inquiries. It forwarded its 
recommendations to Attorney General Wako, who in turn instructed Tobiko on what to do 
in each case: whether it should proceed to trial, be withdrawn and closed for lack of 
evidence, or be sent back to police for further investigations. 
 
The report—produced in February 2009 but made public only after ICC prosecutor Moreno 
Ocampo submitted it to the ICC in November 2009 as part of his application for 
authorization to begin Kenya investigations—found that in “a very high number of cases,” 
after the filing of a complaint, there had been “no subsequent follow-up.”43 Inquest files in 
all provinces “were far from complete in as far as investigations were concerned”; in some 
killings, inquest files were never opened.44 The report recommended that the attorney 
general direct the commissioner of police to ensure that investigations be undertaken or 
completed within a given time frame.45  
 
As far as Human Rights Watch was able to ascertain, there was no follow-up to the report. 
It did not result in new investigations or prosecutions. Most cases were never 
“resubmitted” to the attorney general after “further investigations,” as directed by the 
attorney general in the report.46 
 
The attorney general’s office also made no effort to prioritize cases for investigation and 
prosecution. For instance, the report listed 3,325 files in Rift Valley province with no known 
suspects, most of which contained only the complainant’s statement. The director of 
public prosecutions, at that time subordinate to the attorney general, directed “that 
investigations be completed within 30 days and the files be re-submitted to the Attorney 
General for further directions.”47 It is difficult to imagine how police in one province, 
unassisted, could investigate 3,325 cases within 30 days. 
 
The report also made recommendations on judicial reform. It highlighted the need to 
“urgently address the issue of staff capacity in the Division of Public Prosecutions” and to 
                                                          
43 Republic of Kenya, Department of Public Prosecutions, “A Report to the Hon. Attorney General by the Team on the Review 
of Post Election Violence Related Cases in Western, Nyanza, Central, Rift Valley, Eastern, Coast and Nairobi Provinces” 
(“Report to the Attorney General, 2009”) Nairobi, February 2009, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc786008.pdf, p. 40. 
44 Ibid., p. 40. 
45 Ibid., p. 41. 
46 A subsequent March 2011 Department of Public Prosecutions report claims that country-wide, there have been 94 
convictions for post-election violence; 57 acquittals; and 179 withdrawn cases (totaling 330); and at least 62 additional 
cases pending before the courts. Yet 350 “concluded cases” are listed in the February 2009 report. The two reports may be 
based on different sets of statistics, but the fact that there are fewer concluded cases listed in the 2011 report suggests a 
lack of progress. 
47 Republic of Kenya, Department of Public Prosecutions, “Report to the Attorney General, 2009”, p. 14. 
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improve terms and conditions for State Counsel in order to attract highly-qualified civilian 
prosecutors.48 While there was little progress in the specific cases identified in the report, 
some steps have been taken toward implementing these recommended reforms, 
discussed in Chapter IX below.  
 
Police Investigation of Sexual Offences 
The Waki Report leveled harsh criticism at the Kenyan police for its failure to investigate 
rape and other sexual offences committed during the violence.49 Dozens of women had 
filed rape complaints with the police, but the complaints had not led to a single known 
prosecution.50 On October 17, 2008, two days after the Waki Report was published, the 
police announced it was forming a task force to investigate sexual offences related to the 
election violence.51 The task force was to include female police officers, as well as lawyers 
and counselors from the Kenyan chapter of the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA).  
 
FIDA, which had documented gang rape by men in police uniform as well as by civilians 
during the post-election violence, withdrew from the task force in November 2008, after 
being excluded from its planning.52 According to a FIDA representative, “The task force was 
a response to the outcry over the fact that police were not doing anything about victims of 
rape. We heard we were to be part of the task force, but we asked the police repeatedly for 
meetings and they were never convened. There was no willingness to work with us.”53 
 
The task force’s subsequent work has not been widely publicized. A Kenyan women’s 
rights activist told Human Rights Watch, “They went around meeting a few victims, but it 
lacked credibility.”54 A representative of a health center that treated sexual violence 
victims complained to the press that the task force simply wrote to the center requesting 
the names of victims, which would have constituted a violation of clients’ privacy. Staff 
wrote back to explain they could not grant that request, but proposed meeting to discuss 
strategies to get victims to come forward voluntarily. The police never responded.55  
                                                          
48 Republic of Kenya, Department of Public Prosecutions, “Report to the Attorney General, 2009”, p. 42.  
49 CIPEV, pp. 399-404. 
50 Human Rights Watch interview with Ann Njogu, Chairperson, Center for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW), Nairobi, 
September 9, 2011.  
51 Eric Kiraithe, “Police Task Force to Investigate Rape Cases During the Post-Election Violence,” Kenya Police, October 17, 
2008, http://www.kenyapolice.go.ke/News136.asp (accessed September 1, 2011).  
52 “Fida pulls out of probe team,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), November 13, 2008; Bornice Biomndo, “Police linked to poll chaos 
rapes,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), November 14, 2008, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/491190/-/tm24ji/-/index.html 
(accessed July 20, 2011).  
53 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a representative of FIDA, September 1, 2011.  
54 Human Rights Watch interview with Ann Njogu, September 9, 2011.  
55 “Gang rape during the poll crisis,” Capital News (Kenya), January 9, 2009, 
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2009/01/12/gang-rape-during-the-poll-crisis/ (accessed September 1, 2011).  
       21       HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | DECEMBER 2011 
The task force also visited different locations in Eldoret in December 2008 to identify 
victims of sexual violence. An officer on the team testified, in one of the few rape cases 
subsequently brought before the courts, “We told the IDPs [internally displaced persons] 
that we were looking for victims who were defiled or raped.”56 That particular case resulted 
in an acquittal.  
 
It is not clear whether the task force’s work resulted in any convictions. The Department of 
Public Prosecutions’ March 2011 report to the Attorney General lists 49 alleged rape and 
defilement convictions, but the list is almost wholly inaccurate, as discussed below.57 
 
The task force’s investigation did, however, result in a list of 66 complaints, which police 
submitted to the director of public prosecutions in 2009. Most complaints involved rapes 
allegedly committed by members of the security forces. According to Director of Public 
Prosecutions Tobiko: 
 
The police had recommended, in almost all these cases, closure for lack of 
evidence, because they said the complainants had taken too long to 
complain, and that there were difficulties in identification because these 
were strangers—many victims just talked about uniformed men. Most of the 
files [the police] sent us had nothing more than a statement from the 
complainant. A team from the Directorate of Public Prosecutions analyzed 
the files, together with the sexual offenses law. All of the files were sent 
back to the police last year for further investigation. We disagreed with their 
assessment that the files should be closed. In some cases, victims 
contracted HIV or were impregnated through the rape; some had torn 
clothing or underpants which were not subjected to forensic analysis; some 
had cell phones stolen during the assault and those cell phones could have 
been tracked. In some cases, spent cartridges were found in the area.… The 
files haven’t been sent back to us yet.58 
 
                                                          
56 Testimony from C.I. Grace Mwangi, Eldoret Magistrate’s Court, CR 5976/08, case file consulted by Human Rights Watch, 
Eldoret, May 24, 2011.  
57 “A Progress Report to the Hon. Attorney General by the Team on Update of Post Election Violence Related Cases in Western, 
Nyanza, Central, Rift-Valley, Eastern, Coast and Nairobi Provinces,” (“Progress Report to the Hon. Attorney General 2011”), 
March 2011, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1062628.pdf (accessed September 24, 2011), annex 3 to Prosecutor v. 
William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11, “Filing of Annexes of Materials to the 
Application of the Government of Kenya Pursuant to Article 19 of the Rome Statute,” April 21, 2011, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1062623.pdf (accessed September 24, 2011).  
58 Human Rights Watch interview with Director of Public Prosecutions Keriako Tobiko, Nairobi, September 22, 2011.  
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Although the Department of Public Prosecutions was correct to send the files back to the 
police for further investigations, it is inexplicable that the work of a task force established 
in 2008 has, three years later, amounted to no more than one report to the Department of 
Public Prosecutions in 2009; one response from the Department of Public Prosecutions in 
2010; and no further results as of September 2011. To date, no member of the security 
forces has been charged for election-related sexual assault, although CIPEV evidence 
suggests that at least 26 percent of women raped during the post-election violence were 
raped by police officers.59  
 
Failure to Create a Special Tribunal 
The Waki Report called on the government to establish a special tribunal, staffed by Kenyan 
and international judges, prosecutors and investigators, with the mandate to prosecute 
crimes committed during the post-election violence. It stipulated that PNU and ODM should 
sign an agreement within 60 days of the report’s publication to create such a tribunal, and 
that within an additional 45 days, a statute to establish the tribunal should be adopted.60  
 
Upon publication of its report, the Waki Commission delivered its list of alleged 
perpetrators, together with supporting evidence against them, to the Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities, led by former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. The panel 
was to safeguard this evidence pending the establishment of a special tribunal; if a tribunal 
was not created, the panel was to turn the names and evidence over to the ICC prosecutor. 
 
Kibaki and Odinga signed an agreement to this effect on December 16, 2008, stipulating 
that a Cabinet Committee would draft a bill. But the cabinet subsequently failed to take 
steps to enact a tribunal.61 A last-minute bill to amend the constitution so as to provide for 
a special tribunal was proposed by Martha Karua, then Minister of Justice, in late January 
2009. However, a group of parliamentarians led by Gitobu Imanyara objected to the bill, 
purportedly on the grounds that politicians would interfere with a local tribunal, and that it 
would be preferable to shift responsibility to the ICC.62 Civil society groups also voiced 
                                                          
59 CIPEV, p. 24. The CIPEV received evidence that 82% of victims of sexual violence did not file reports with the police; in 
32% of these cases, the reason given was that the police themselves were the attackers.  
60 Ibid., pp. 472-475. 
61 Republic of Kenya, State House, “Special Tribunal to Be Set Up,” Nairobi, December 17, 2008, 
http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/dec08/2008171202.htm (accessed July 20, 2011).  
62 Gitau Warigi, “Local tribunal or The Hague?” Daily Nation (Nairobi), January 31, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-
/1056/522542/-/u1tuco/-/index.html (accessed July 20, 2011).  
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objections, including the concern that the tribunal would not be sufficiently shielded from 
political influence.63  
 
The bill was voted down in parliament on February 12, 2009.64 Kibaki asked Annan to allow 
more time for Kenya to establish a special mechanism, and the Kenyan government 
continued to assure the ICC that it would set up a local tribunal or other domestic judicial 
mechanism by September 2009 or, if that proved impossible, would refer the situation to 
the ICC itself.65 
 
On July 9, frustrated with Kenya’s delaying tactics, Annan handed over a sealed envelope 
containing Waki’s list of suspects to the ICC prosecutor, stating that “Justice delayed is 
justice denied.” Newly-appointed Justice Minister Mutula Kilonzo brought a new draft bill 
before the cabinet, which would have amended the constitution to create a special 
tribunal.66 But on July 30, following a cabinet meeting that discussed options for 
accountability, the government issued an obfuscating statement that rejected both a 
special tribunal and a referral to the ICC, saying, “The cabinet on Thursday rejected a local 
tribunal and instead settled on Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) to deal 
with post-election violence perpetrators.… ‘This does not in any way reduce its desire to 
punish impunity’, stated the President.”67 
 
Civil society groups protested that the cabinet’s decision amounted to doing nothing.68 
One group described the decision as an “act of subverting justice and indicative of a 
country that is regressing into a failed state.”69 A Kenyan legal scholar characterized the 
justice debate as “held hostage to the personal and political agendas of those with 
                                                          
63 “Establishing a Special Tribunal for Kenya and the Role of the International Criminal Court: Questions and Answers,” 
Human Rights Watch, March 25, 2009, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2009_Kenya_SpecialTribunal_0.pdf.  
64 101 MPs voted in favor of the bill, while 93 voted against it. The threshold of votes to amend the constitution is 65 percent. 
65 International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, “Agreed Minutes of the meeting between Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo and the delegation of the Kenyan government,” The Hague, July 3, 2009, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/6D005625-2248-477A-9485-
FC52B4F1F5AD/280560/20090703AgreedMinutesofMeetingProsecutorKenyanDele.pdf (accessed September 26, 2011).  
66 This draft was largely prepared by civil society organizations. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a 
representative of the Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ-Kenya), September 2, 2011, and with 
Member of Parliament Hon. Gitobu Imanyara, Nairobi, September 9, 2011. 
67 Republic of Kenya, Office of Public Communications, “Cabinet Decides on TJRC,” July 30, 2011, 
http://www.communication.go.ke/media.asp?id=940 (accessed July 20, 2011).  
68 International Center for Policy and Conflict, “Open Letter to President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga,” 
August 5, 2009, http://www.icpcafrica.org/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=118:letter-to-prime-
minister-and-president-tjrc-and-special-tribunal&catid=31:general&Itemid=46) (accessed September 7, 2011).  
69 David Ohito, “How Cabinet killed tribunal,” The Standard (Nairobi), July 31, 2011, 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/archives/InsidePage.php?id=1144020506&cid=4& (accessed July 20, 2011). 
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power,” motivated “not by the imperative to do justice for victims but by the threat a 
particular approach could pose to political interests in the country.”70 
 
Yet another attempt to legislate a local tribunal, the Constitutional Amendment Bill—this 
time proposed by member of parliament (MP) Gitobu Imanyara, who had led opposition to 
the Karua bill—stalled in November 2009 when MPs failed to turn up in Parliament, 
effectively killing debate on the bill. At a scheduled parliamentary hearing on the proposed 
legislation on November 11, 2009, only 18 out of 222 parliamentarians were present.71 
 
Due to Kenya’s failure to establish a local mechanism or to refer the situation to the ICC, on 
November 26, 2009, ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo requested leave from the court 
to investigate crimes against humanity in Kenya.72 The court authorized the investigations 
on March 31, 2010. In December 2010, Moreno Ocampo announced that he would seek 
summonses against six principal suspects: William Ruto, Henry Kosgey, and Joshua arap 
Sang on the ODM side, and Francis Muthaura, Uhuru Kenyatta, and Hussein Ali on the PNU 
side. “Confirmation of charges” hearings, to determine whether the prosecutor has 
sufficient evidence for the cases to proceed were held in September and October 2011; 
decisions in the two cases were expected by January 2012.73 
 
In a statement that proved to mark the beginning of concerted efforts to evade the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, President Kibaki announced on December 15—immediately following Moreno 
Ocampo’s naming of the six suspects—that “the government is fully committed to the 
establishment of a local tribunal to deal with those behind the post-election violence, in 
accordance with stipulations of the new constitution.”74 At this writing, no fresh steps had 
formally been taken toward establishing a tribunal. 
 
 
                                                          
70 Godfrey Musila, “Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya: Autonomy and the Challenge of External Presciptions,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, October 8, 2009, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 459. 
71 “Kenya MPs were decisive in rejecting local court,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), April 10, 2011, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/MPs+were+decisive+in+rejecting+local+court+/-/1064/1142230/-/dhml7bz/-
/index.html (accessed July 20, 2011). In December, MPs again failed to show up in Parliament to vote on the bill, 
demonstrating a lack of appetite for justice. See Caroline Wafula, “Kenya MPs shun debate on tribunal bill,” Daily Nation 
(Nairobi), December 2, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/816280/-/vnj8oe/-/index.html.  
72 “ICC: Prosecutor Seeks OK on Kenya Inquiry,” Human Rights Watch news release, November 26, 2009, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/11/26/icc-prosecutor-seeks-ok-kenya-inquiry. 
73 “Kenya: Q&A on Pre-Trial Hearing in First ICC Case,” Human Rights Watch news release, August 30, 2011, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/30/kenya-qa-pre-trial-hearing-first-icc-case. 
74 Republic of Kenya, Office of Public Communications, “Statement by His Excellency the President Hon. Mwai Kibaki,” 
December 15, 2011, http://www.communication.go.ke/media.asp?id=1246 (accessed September 13, 2011).  
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The Department of Public Prosecutions Report of March 2011 
In March 2011 the Department of Public Prosecutions compiled a second report for the 
attorney general on the status of post-election violence cases, to update the 2009 report. 
Research for the report was conducted under time constraints in order to submit the report 
as evidence in Kenya’s admissibility challenge before the ICC. In all, the report found that 
as of March 2011 there had been 94 convictions for post-election violence.75 
 
It is evident that the report was compiled hastily, with little concern for accuracy. Such a 
report could potentially be a useful tool for a future special mechanism, or simply for 
tracking the status of cases in the ordinary courts with an eye to making recommendations 
for improvement. But the report is riddled with errors. Most glaringly, a number of cases 
included in the report have nothing to do with the election violence. Vaunting convictions 
in ordinary criminal cases as evidence of success in combating impunity for post-election 
violence is either intentionally misleading or is the unintended outcome of sloppy work. 
The actual number of known post-election violence convictions is significantly lower than 
the report indicated.  
 
The prominently featured chapter on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is 
particularly problematic. Rather than demonstrating the authorities’ concern for sexual 
violence victims, it showcases the opposite: an absolute lack of effort to be accurate on 
sexual violence cases. Four cases on the list of 49 alleged SGBV convictions actually 
resulted in acquittals, according to the list itself.76 Two of the alleged “convictions on 
gender-based post-election violence cases” on the list involve men who “had carnal 
knowledge with a sheep.”77 
 
Human Rights Watch investigated 17 of the remaining cases, by consulting files and 
interviewing police and judicial officials. Researchers found that three other alleged 
convictions were in fact either acquittals or convictions on lesser or entirely different 
charges. One of those cases was the only clearly election related sexual assault case on the 
list, and it resulted in an acquittal on the sexual assault charges, the conviction being for 
                                                          
75 “A Progress Report to the Hon. Attorney General 2011,” March 2011, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1062628.pdf, 
p. 70-72. The convictions included 50 in the Rift Valley, 7 in Western province, 25 in Nyanza province, 5 in Coast province, 
and 7 in Nairobi. The report further found that 57 cases had been acquitted; 179 had been withdrawn; 21 were pending the 
arrest of known persons; and at least 62 were pending before the courts, while 3386 cases were “pending under 
investigation.” Of inquest files, 3 had been finalized and closed; 74 were “pending investigations”; and for 16 additional 
inquests, in Western province, the status was unclear.  
76 Ibid., p. 21, cases 37-40. 
77 Ibid., p. 17, cases 13 and 17. 
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robbery with violence.78 At least nine of the gender-based violence convictions appeared, 
upon consultation of the court files, wholly unrelated to the elections.79 At least three of the 
file numbers on the list were wrong.80 Based on this research, it is unclear whether there 
has been a single conviction for post-election related sexual and gender based violence. 
 
Apart from the sexual violence cases, also counted as successful convictions in the report 
are the following, among many other questionable additions to the list: 
 
• On January 31, 2011, Andrew Moeche Omwenga killed ODM member of parliament 
David Too and police officer Eunice Chepkwony in Eldoret. Omwenga turned 
himself in and was subsequently convicted of manslaughter. But organizations 
familiar with the case said it was unrelated to post-election violence, but was a 
crime of passion related to a love triangle involving the perpetrator and the two 
victims.81 The judge reached the same conclusion.82 
• On January 1, 2008, Ben Pkiech Loyatum, an Administration Police officer, shot and 
killed his neighbor Robert Bagwasi Onsarigo. Loyatum was convicted in October 
2010. However, the source of the conflict seemed to be an unpaid debt. No 
evidence suggested that the killing was related to the election violence.83  
• The report includes cases involving incidents that took place well outside the time 
frame relevant to the election violence, including an assault in 2006.84  
• A case listed as “robbery with violence,” in which the accused were “sentenced to 
death” according to the report, turned out to be an attempted rape case in which 
the accused were acquitted.85 
                                                          
78 Republic v. Mohammed Nyangala, Kakamega Magistrate’s Court, CR 221/08, resulted in an acquittal. In Republic v. James 
Mbugua Ndungu, Raymond Munene Kamau, the accused were convicted of robbery with violence, but acquitted of attempted 
rape. In Republic v. Joseph Omukhulo, Butere Magistrate’s Court, CR 35/08, the accused was sentenced to one year for 
“indecent act,” not ten years for rape, as claimed in the Department of Public Prosecutions report.  
79 See Appendix I. 
80 Kakamega CR 107/08 was a robbery case; Kakamega CR 913/08 was a stealing case; Butere CR 90/08 was a gambling 
case. 
81 Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives of ICJ-Kenya, Nairobi, May 6, 2011, and with a representative of the 
KHRC, Nairobi, August 2, 2011.  
82 Noah Chepleon, “Policeman Jailed for Ten Years Over MP's Killing,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), October 29, 2009, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200910290723.html (accessed November 27, 2011).  
83 Republic v. Ben Pkiech Loyatum, Eldoret High Court, HCCR 5/08. Case file consulted by Human Rights Watch, Eldoret, May 
25, 2011. His appeal is currently in progress, filed at Eldoret Appeals Court as No. 389/10. The case is somewhat encouraging 
in that fellow police officers testified against Loyatum, demonstrating that police do not always cover up for their colleagues; 
but the same does not seem to hold true for cases that are in fact election-related. 
84 Republic v. Nicholas Oyamo, Eldoret Magistrate’s Court, CR 414/08, an assault case that filed in 2008, involving an 
incident that took place on April 28, 2006. Case file consulted by Human Rights Watch, Eldoret, May 24, 2011.  
85 Republic v. John Kiragu and Another, Naivasha Magistrate’s Court, CR 167/08. Case file consulted by Human Rights Watch, 
Naivasha, May 23, 2011. 
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• An assault case listed among the post-election violence convictions turned out to 
be a domestic violence incident, in which a man hit his ex-girlfriend during a 
dispute over money.86  
 
Of the convictions listed in the report that are in fact related to the violence, the majority 
were for minor offenses like “taking part in a riot” or “handling stolen property.” These 
convictions do not constitute credible evidence of the state’s attempt to deliver justice. 
Human Rights Watch looked for further evidence of convictions for serious crimes but 
found few. The only convictions Human Rights Watch identified for the serious crimes of 
murder and robbery with violence are discussed in Chapter VI, below. 
 
Despite the sloppy nature of the report, its authors issued some worthy recommendations, 
including “continuous periodical review of these cases otherwise most files may lie 
unattended to without discovery thus denying the affected victims justice.” They 
recommended further review of cases with special attention to the Rift Valley.87 The further 
review has not been undertaken. 
 
Kenya’s Investigations of ICC Suspects 
After ICC prosecutor Moreno Ocampo requested summonses for six suspects, factions 
within the Kenyan political elite initiated a campaign to circumvent the ICC. First, 
parliament moved to ask the government to withdraw from the Rome Statute, though the 
government did not act on the request.88 Second, Kenya petitioned the United Nations 
Security Council to defer the ICC investigation for one year, on the grounds that ICC 
prosecutions were potentially divisive and could derail national reforms needed to pave 
the way for prosecutions in Kenya of the post-election violence.89 The Security Council held 
informal consultations on the request, but came to no consensus that the cases 
threatened international peace and security.90 
 
                                                          
86 Republic v. Lichuma Melchizedek, Eldoret Magistrate’s Court, CR 457/08. Case file consulted by Human Rights Watch, 
Eldoret, May 24, 2011.  
87 “A Progress Report to the Hon. Attorney General 2011,” March 2011, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1062628.pdf, 
p. 77-78.  
88 Njeri Rugene, “Parliament pulls Kenya from ICC treaty,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), December 22, 2010, 
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(accessed September 26, 2011).  
89 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), A/CONF. 183/9, July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 
2002, art. 16. The article provides that a proceeding can be deferred if there is a threat to international peace and security. 
90 See “Observations and Recommendations on the International Criminal Court and the African Union,” Human Rights 
Watch news release, June 27, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/node/99945. 
 “TURNING PEBBLES”      28 
Third, Kenya filed an admissibility challenge before the ICC. It claimed that as a result of 
the adoption of its new constitution and other reforms, it was now capable of investigating 
the six suspects. However, the ICC rejected the challenge in May 2011, finding “no concrete 
evidence of ongoing proceedings before national judges” and holding that such a 
challenge could only succeed if the accused were facing similar charges in a national court 
at the time of the challenge.91  
 
Kenya appealed the ICC’s decision, submitting new evidence claiming that fresh 
investigations into the six suspects were underway. According to the July 2011 submission, 
Kenyan police had interviewed 35 witnesses in the Rift Valley concerning the role of the six 
suspects in orchestrating violence, but had not yet found sufficient evidence to charge 
them before Kenyan courts.92 The ICC rejected the appeal in August.93 
 
These half-hearted efforts to pursue accountability in Kenya have translated into very little 
justice for victims. The specific weaknesses that plagued the few investigations and 
prosecutions that were brought forward are discussed below. 
                                                          
91 “ICC rejects Kenya's admissibility challenge,” The Hague Justice Portal Net, May 31, 2011, 
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III. Government Prosecutions of “Priority” Cases and 
Other Serious Crimes: A Failure 
 
Had Kenyan decision-makers truly intended to rely on the ICC or the proposed special 
tribunal to prosecute some election-related crimes, that would still not have explained 
away the striking absence of progress of cases in the ordinary courts.  
 
While some cases crept forward in the ordinary courts, most never reached the courts at all. 
These included most of the government’s “priority cases,” in which the authorities were 
never able to identify or arrest suspects. No one has ever been arrested in the killings of 
Nahashon Mburu or District Irrigation officer Charles Keittany Korir, despite claims from 
former Police Commissioner Hussein Ali in March 2008 that investigations were complete 
“pending the arrest of suspects.”94 Nor was anyone arrested in the burning of a house in 
Naivasha that killed 19 people; according to police, the house was burned by a mob and 
no witnesses were able to identify individual suspects.95 
 
Human Rights Watch conducted research into the prosecution of 76 cases that did reach 
the courts, most of them high-profile cases and cases involving serious crimes, in order to 
determine why so few of these cases resulted in convictions. The following section 
discusses the outcomes in some of these cases. Of these 76 cases, not one demonstrates 
any attempt to investigate those responsible for organizing and directing the violence, 
which should have been a top priority. None of the many local politicians suspected in the 






                                                          
94 Cyrus Ombati, “Kenya: Police Probe 9,000 Post-Election Violence Cases,” The Standard (Nairobi), March 21, 2008, 
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cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1207443.pdf (accessed September 23, 2011), para. 70. 
 “TURNING PEBBLES”      30 
Acquittals and Withdrawals in Six High-Profile Cases 
1. Republic v. Stephen Kiprotich Leting & 3 Others (The Kiambaa Church Burning)96 
On January 1, 2008, at least several hundred attackers set fire to the Assemblies of God 
church at Kiambaa farm in Eldoret, where Kikuyus were taking refuge from the violence. At 
least 28 were killed, and dozens more were injured.  
 
The Criminal Investigation Department carried out prompt investigations, led by 
Superintendent of Police John Mwachai of CID’s Nairobi branch. Police interviewed most of 
the Kiambaa survivors within a few weeks of the attack.97 Based on the interviews, police 
opened a case file charging four suspects, Stephen Kiprotich Leting, Emmanuel Kiptoo 
Lamai, Clement Kipkemei Lamai, and Julius Nyongio Rono, with murder. Apparently, police 
were initially working from a list of about 20 suspects, and several others apart from the 
four charged were arrested in March 2008, but were released without charge.98 
 
Victims knew a number of their attackers, whom they described as a band ranging from 
several hundred to several thousand people, including some of their Kalenjin neighbors as 
well as persons brought in from elsewhere.99 They found it difficult to understand why 
some suspects named in interviews with the police were never arrested. According to one 
victim, several suspects that she named fled the area at the time. However, she said, 
“When the others were acquitted, they came back. But the police never followed any 
others apart from the four who were taken to court.”100  
 
On April 30, 2009, the Nakuru High Court acquitted the four following a trial.101 The judge 
found that Emmanuel Kiptoo Lamai, according to witness testimony, was helping people at 
the scene; no one who testified before the court had seen him involved in acts of violence. 
The prosecutor did not present a single witness to testify against Clement Kipkemei Lamai, 
and eventually conceded he had no evidence against him.102 Leting and Rono presented 
alibi defenses, which the prosecution failed to challenge; further, the judge found the 
witness testimony implicating Leting and Rono to be unreliable.  
                                                          
96 Republic v. Stephen Kiprotich Leting & 3 Others, Nakuru High Court, HCCR 34/2008. Court file consulted by Human Rights 
Watch, Nakuru, August 22, 2011.  
97 Human Rights Watch interviews with Kiambaa survivors, Rironi IDP camp, April 26, 2011.  
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100 Human Rights Watch interview, Eldoret, May 26, 2011.  
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A lawyer interviewed by Human Rights Watch said the case was characterized by “shoddy 
investigations,” a statement echoed in the court’s judgment.103 Police failed to get Kalenjin 
witnesses to testify. The judge pointed out that in addition to flawed evidence against the 
four suspects, the prosecution presented no theory concerning the planning of the attack, 
or how the suspects might have been involved in it. He noted: 
 
At about 10:00 a.m. on 1/1/2008, the Church was raided by a gang of about 
4,000 marauding youths whose faces were smeared with chalk and were 
armed with machetes, spears, arrows and bows and all manner of crude 
weapons. They slashed and hacked to death anyone they found outside the 
Church and set it on fire thus killing many more. This was obviously a 
planned attack. But there is not even a whiff of that plan in this case. There 
is no indication that the police ever investigated that aspect of the case 
and yet in my view, as I have said, that should have been the core of their 
investigations. We are told that up to 4,000 raiders attacked the Church 
and killed about 30 people, including the deceased in this case. We have 
only four suspects in court. Where are the others?104 
 
The rush to try the case may have inhibited efforts to arrive at a prosecution theory that 
explained how the attack was planned. One police officer testified that police recorded 
about 5,000 statements.105 The two months between when the statements were taken and 
the opening of judicial proceedings may have been inadequate for police to sort through 
5,000 statements, find corroborating evidence, and build a case.  
 
For the Kiambaa survivors, the fact that no one has been convicted of the crime is an 
emblem of injustice. One victim said, “It seems as if the people of Kiambaa have been 
forgotten. As if the whole incident has been buried.”106 Anthony Ng’ang’a, the chairperson 
of a group of displaced people from the Kiambaa survivors, told Human Rights Watch he 
found the accused’s certainty that they would be released to be suspicious: “You end up 
asking yourself, is it politics or is it justice, or what is going on? The suspects told us 
before the trial that they were sure they would be released and that we could not come 
                                                          
103 Human Rights Watch interview with a lawyer, Nakuru, August 22, 2011; Republic v. Stephen Kiprotich Leting & Three 
Others, judgment.  
104 Republic v. Stephen Kiprotich Leting & 3 Others, judgment. A lawyer familiar with the case seconded this criticism, stating, 
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105 Republic v. Stephen Kiprotich Leting & 3 Others, testimony of prosecution witness 24, S.P. Prosper Bosire.  
106 Human Rights Watch interview, Rironi, April 26, 2011. 
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back to our land.”107 One impact of the lack of justice is that many survivors are still afraid 
to return home; they recognize that their attackers remain in the area, enjoying complete 
impunity. While the Kiambaa church burning forms a part of the charges the ICC prosecutor 
is seeking against Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang,108 these statements point to the importance of 
additional prosecutions in Kenya to target lower and mid-level perpetrators.  
 
2. Republic v. Jackson Kibor109 
Jackson Kibor, an ODM politician, was arrested on February 20, 2008, and charged with 
incitement to violence. In a January 31, 2008, interview with the BBC, Kibor, recognized as 
an opinion leader in Eldoret, declared “war” against Kikuyus and promoted their removal 
from the area.110 Kibor was released on bond on February 28. The case was to proceed to 
trial, but on April 6, 2009, the attorney general’s office withdrew the charges.  
 
The withdrawal of charges, known as a nolle prosequi, does not require any official 
justification from the state.111 However, a lawyer in Eldoret told Human Rights Watch that 
the case was withdrawn in part because the prosecution never submitted into evidence the 
recording of the BBC interview.112 A judicial official also told Human Rights Watch the 
withdrawal of the Kibor case was based on the absence of the BBC footage. He said the 
responsibility to obtain the footage lay with police investigators.113 However, Human Rights 
Watch found that the police did have access to the footage, which remained posted on 
BBC’s website throughout the period during which the Kibor case was in the courts.114 
Director of Public Prosecutions Tobiko told Human Rights Watch the case was withdrawn 
because the British government did not respond to a request that the BBC journalist return 
to Nairobi to testify. He had not explored other possibilities for introducing the evidence, 
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112 Human Rights Watch interview with a lawyer, Eldoret, May 27, 2011.  
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such as through a BBC official other than the journalist.115 Nothing in Kenya’s Evidence Act 
prevents the introduction of audio material in the absence of the person who recorded it.116 
 
Kenyan law permits prosecutors to reinitiate cases that have been withdrawn due to lack of 
evidence—an option for the Kibor case, either under a special mechanism or in the 
ordinary courts.117 
 
3. Republic v. Edward Kirui118 
On January 16, 2008, a journalist from Kenya Television Network (KTN), while filming anti-
Kibaki demonstrations in Kondele, a Kisumu neighborhood, captured footage of a police 
officer shooting two unarmed protestors, George William Onyango and Ismail Chacha. Both 
young men died as a result of the shootings.119 
 
The footage was shown on KTN’s evening news. Police spokesperson Eric Kiraithe initially 
dismissed it as computer generated, equating it to a “Rambo movie.”120 But when 
Onyango’s brother spoke out about the killing at a press conference, police were forced to 
take the matter more seriously. Police constable Edward Kirui was arrested on the basis 
that he was identified in the video.  
 
The case went to trial in April 2008, and was concluded in February 2009. The prosecution 
presented eyewitness testimony from persons present at the crime scene who recognized 
Kirui as the shooter.121 Further, two police officers, including Chief Inspector Hansent Kaloki, 
the Officer Commanding Station at Kondele at the time of the shooting, testified that they 
recognized Kirui in the video footage. The KTN footage was presented in court as evidence.  
 
However, on June 21, 2010, Kirui was acquitted. Kenyan civil society organizations have 
attributed the acquittal to police tampering with the evidence.122 According to testimony 
                                                          
115 Human Rights Watch interview with Keriako Tobiko, Nairobi, September 22, 2011.  
116 Evidence Act, National Council for Law Reporting, Chapter 80 of the Laws of Kenya, revised 2009.  
117 Criminal Procedure Code, section 82(1).  
118 Republic v. Edward Kirui, Nairobi High Court, HCCR 9/08. 
119 The KTN footage is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcJqA2bdIyc (accessed July 18, 2011).  
120 Human Rights Watch interview with a lawyer, Kisumu, May 11, 2011. 
121 Republic v. Edward Kirui, ruling. See also testimony of Prosecution Witness 1, 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/view_preview1.php?link=21176940175128656206330 (accessed July 18, 2011).  
122 In a briefing paper circulated by ICJ-Kenya, the organization argued: “One critical question omitted by the judge is 
whether the prosecution was negligent. Why did they fail to see the obvious ‘mistake’? In any case, the prosecution’s case 
was based on the firearm! If this matter is to be put to rest and justice is to be served, these questions ought to be answered. 
Past experiences, and in particular this case, has proved that the police cannot be left to investigate themselves. It is only 
fair that an independent inquiry ought to be instituted, with a clear objective of answering the above questions. The aim 
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from the state firearms examiner, the bullets removed from Onyango’s and Chacha’s 
bodies were traced to an AK-47 rifle with the serial number 3008378; but police sergeant 
Isaac Serem produced in court a log book claiming that a rifle with the serial number 
23008378 had been issued to Kirui on the day of the shootings.123  
 
According to ICJ-Kenya, the case is “a classic case of police officers tampering with the 
evidence in order to cover up for their colleague.”124 One lawyer interviewed argued that 
rather than acquitting Kirui, the judge should have charged the police with contempt of the 
court and ordered investigations into the possible tampering with evidence.125 
 
4. Republic v. Paul Kiptoo Barno, James Yutor Korir, and Isaiah Kipkorir Leting: The 
Killing of Benedict Omolo and Elias Wafula Wakhungu126 
On January 1, 2008, police and a district administration official set off in a pickup truck to 
attempt to disperse violent mobs in the Cheptiret area of Eldoret. The group included the 
district officer of Kesses Division, Benedict Omolo; three police officers, Chief Inspector 
Elias Wafula Wakhungu, Administration Police officer Joseph Biwott, and Administration 
Police constable Job Kipkorir Yegor, who was serving as Omolo’s driver; and National 
Security and Intelligence Service Officer Benjamin Koech. At Chebii Primary School, they 
confronted one such mob, which was blocking the road. 
 
According to testimony presented in court, the mob attacked the vehicle. Police fired into 
the air, injuring a young man in the crowd, Thomas Tendeni, with a stray bullet.127 The 
driver, Yegor, was struck by an axe and by arrows, but survived. Biwott was also assaulted 
with various crude weapons before running away. Koech managed to escape uninjured. 
Omolo and Wafula were mortally wounded by arrows and machetes. Yegor, Biwott, Omolo 
and Wafula were all robbed of their guns during the attack; attackers also stole Yegor’s 
mobile phone.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
would be to prosecute those responsible for any foul play if it is established that there was one.” ICJ-Kenya, “Republic v. 
Edward Kirui: A Classic Case of Evidence Tampering?” unpublished briefing paper, 2010. 
123 Republic v. Edward Kirui, ruling. 
124 ICJ-Kenya, amicus curiae brief submitted to the ICC, April 27, 2011, http://212.159.242.181/iccdocs/doc/doc1064920.pdf 
(accessed July 18, 2011).  
125 Human Rights Watch interview with a lawyer, Nairobi, May 3, 2011.  
126 Republic v. Paul Kiptoo Barno, James Yutor Korir, and Isaiah Kipkorir Leting, Eldoret Magistrate’s Court, CR 387/08. Case 
file consulted by Human Rights Watch, Eldoret, May 23, 2011.  
127 Ibid. It was not clear whether the shooting of the young man precipitated the attack on the officials, or whether it occurred 
in the course of police response to the attack. 
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Later the same day, according to police testimony, the crowd handed over two of the stolen 
guns to “two Kalenjin police officers.”128 The other guns were found on the roadside.129 
 
Three suspects were arrested. One, Paul Kiptoo Barno, was found in possession of Yegor’s 
missing phone. According to police testimony, the two other suspects were arrested 
because they were “among the group chasing the vehicle.”130 
 
Both the police investigations and the police prosecution case were riddled with holes. The 
two “Kalenjin officers” who retrieved guns from the crowd were never named during the trial 
or summoned to testify, and no evidence was presented to suggest police made any effort 
to identify those in the crowd who handed over the guns, nor did they take fingerprints.  
 
Police were vague in their testimony as to the recovery of the mobile phone, explaining 
only that they “received information” that Barno had it. No fingerprints from the phone 
were presented in court, nor were records of its usage between January 1 and Barno’s 
arrest on February 17. Barno’s explanation, that he found the telephone on the ground, was 
never challenged. Police brought no witnesses to testify against the second and third 
accused, and no evidence was presented as to how they had been identified at the scene. 
According to police testimony, Tendeni, the man in the crowd who was shot, “recorded a 
statement but refused to come testify.” His statement was not presented in court and court 
records do not indicate that he was summoned to give evidence. 
 
A further problem lies in the investigating officer’s choice of charges to file. The immediate 
handing over of the guns, along with the context of the attack, makes clear that the attack 
was not intended as a robbery. It should have been qualified as murder, which would have 
resulted in the case being prosecuted before the High Court by a State Counsel rather than 
police prosecutors, who have significantly less training.  
 
An Eldoret lawyer who had followed the case told Human Rights Watch, “The case was 
poorly prosecuted… the evidence lacked corroboration. For instance, the police did not get 
a statement from the fellow who reported to them that the suspect had the victim’s 
                                                          
128 Testimony of Chief Inspector Charles Mutua, Republic v. Paul Kiptoo Barno, James Yutor Korir, and Isaiah Kipkorir Leting. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Testimony of Police Superintendent Sammy Musyoka, then Division Criminal Investigations Officer for Nandi North, 
Republic v. Paul Kiptoo Barno, James Yutor Korir, and Isaiah Kipkorir Leting. 
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phone.”131 A magistrate confirmed that the acquittal was the result of “shoddy 
investigations.”132  
 
All three suspects were acquitted in September 2008. The magistrate ruled that of the 16 
witnesses produced by the prosecution, none of them produced evidence linking the 
accused to the deaths of Omolo and Wafula. She faulted the prosecution for bringing the 
matter to court without carrying out proper investigations.133 
 
5. Republic v. Francis Kipn’geno and Others: The Killing of Administration Police Officer 
Hassan Omar Dado134 
On January 31, 2008, a mob attacked the administrative and police offices in Ainamoi, a 
small town outside of Kericho. The attack immediately followed news of the killing of 
Ainamoi Member of Parliament David Too, shot in Eldoret the same day in an incident 
wrongly interpreted by Too’s supporters as an election-related assassination.135  
 
The initial motive of the attackers, according to a lawyer familiar with the case, may have 
been to steal guns from the armory located within the district offices. However, police 
responded by firing on the crowd, killing at least one member of the mob and injuring 
others.136 In response, the mob set upon an Administration Police officer at the scene, 
Hassan Omar Dado. They chopped him to pieces with machetes and torched his remains, 
leaving his body burned beyond recognition.137 The attackers also injured another police 
officer, Paul Chumo, and the local chief, Richard Bett. They burned down the district office, 
damaged other administration buildings, and stole one firearm from Chumo. 
 
Suspects were arrested on February 6. According to a lawyer, police simply rounded up 
those who were hospitalized after being shot during the confrontation. They were charged 
with robbery with violence, although, as in the case above, a murder charge may have been 
more appropriate and may have allowed for a stronger prosecution. When the case went to 
                                                          
131 Human Rights Watch interview with a lawyer, Eldoret, May 27, 2011.  
132 Human Rights Watch interview with a judicial official, Eldoret, May 24, 2011.  
133 Article reproduced on the website of Mars Group, a Kenyan organization, untitled and undated, 
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dbc0ccb02662 (accessed November 2, 2011).  
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135 Human Rights Watch interview with a lawyer, Kericho, August 24, 2011. 
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trial, the prosecutor presented no evidence to link any of the suspects to the killing of Dado, 
the assault on Chumo, or the theft of his firearm. Only one suspect was convicted, Joseph 
Cheruiyot Sawe, based on evidence that he had assaulted Richard Bett. He was convicted of 
simple assault and was released after paying a fine. An Ainamoi resident interviewed by 
Human Rights Watch questioned the light sentence, noting that Bett suffered a serious 
machete wound and had developed epilepsy as a result of his injuries.138 
 
6. The Killing of Father Michael Kamau 
Father Michael Kamau, a Kikuyu priest, was killed by a mob armed with bows and arrows at 
Muserechi, in Eldama Ravine district, on January 26, 2008. His killing shortly followed that 
of District Officer Charles Keittany Korir in Molo on January 22, for which no one was 
arrested. According to a police officer,  
 
Kikuyus were suspected. Between the 22nd and the 26th, another woman 
and her sons, Kikuyus, were killed on Eldoret-Nakuru Highway as 
vengeance for [Korir’s killing]. No one was killed in this area before. If it was 
just about politics, they would have killed many more people, but the 
killing of the priest, like the lady, was about revenge.139 
 
According to police investigations, Father Kamau was giving a lift to two Kikuyus seeking to 
flee the North Rift. His vehicle arrived at a road block, where the assailants checked their 
identification papers. When the assailants saw that Kamau and his passengers were 
Kikuyus, they started shooting them with arrows. Kamau was killed, while one passenger 
escaped; the other was seriously injured and hospitalized for a year. Both passengers later 
told police they could not identify the assailants.  
 
Police arrested 17 men who were manning a roadblock in the area where Father Kamau was 
killed. However, they were unable to provide evidence linking any of the 17 to the murder. 
The attorney general’s office withdrew the case on the basis of lack of evidence.140 
 
Acquittals and Withdrawals in Other Serious Cases 
Most other serious cases, including murder, robbery with violence, and rape, also resulted 
in acquittals.  
 
                                                          
138 Human Rights Watch interview, Ainamoi, August 26, 2011. 
139 Human Rights Watch interview with a police official, Rift Valley province, April 28, 2011. 
140 Ibid. 
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In several rape cases acquittals hinged on identification. Such was the case in Republic v. 
Erick Kibet Towett and Simion Kipyegon Chepkwony, in which the suspects were accused 
of gang rape and robbery with violence in Kericho District on December 31, 2007. Because 
the rape victim did not provide the names of any suspects in her first statement to the 
police, and only named them in a later statement, the judge ruled that the identification 
process was unclear.141  
 
Similarly, in Republic v. Julius Cheruiyot Kogo, a rape case in Eldoret, the court acquitted 
the accused because when the victim first reported the rape, she did not provide the 
suspect’s name.142 The victim told Human Rights Watch that she knew the suspect by 
appearance, only learning his name later, and that she could have identified him if a line-
up had been held. She did not understand why he was not convicted. Her father told 
Human Rights Watch, “We can’t return to Nandi now, because there is no justice. How can 
we live with the people who did this?”143 
 
No security officers were charged with rape, despite numerous attempts by victims to 
report such rapes.144 Police spokesperson Kiraithe told the media that “a lot of allegations 
during that period against security personnel were mere propaganda.”145 
 
Few murder cases made it to the courts. One that did was Republic v. Abraham Karonei and 
Robert Kamaiyo Tanui. The suspects were accused of killing Evanson Ndungu Karanja, a 
Kikuyu who had run for councilor in Kesses Division. Karanja was attacked by a mob armed 
with clubs, arrows, and spears on December 31, 2007. Neighbors took Karanja, still alive 
but severely injured, to a police camp, where he died during the night. After his family 
brought the body home the following day, the house was set on fire, and Karanja’s body 
burned. Despite eyewitness testimony placing both suspects at the scene of the killing, 
they were acquitted, in part because police failed to tender evidence—including DNA tests, 
although they had been carried out—documenting the cause of death and the victim’s 
identity.146 
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In Nakuru district, a murder case, Republic v. Peterson Geteri and Three Others, was 
withdrawn with no explanation.147 Peterson Geteri, Denis Moranga Nyambune, Stephen 
Onserio Nyawaya (alias Kinyaga), and Dominic Mogaka Ondera, all apparently Kisiis, were 
charged with killing James Kigen, a Kalenjin, in Barina sub-location on January 17, 2008. 
The killing followed lootings of Kisii houses by Kalenjin mobs. According to a local chief, 
the perpetrators may have suspected Kigen of having been involved, although when the 
police investigated the case they did not find any looted property in Kigen’s possession. 
The attackers caught up with him as he was walking home from a local bar. They killed him 
with machetes, slicing most of the flesh off his leg.148 
 
The four suspects were arrested on the basis of eyewitness testimony, and the Nakuru 
High Court began hearings in the case in April 2008. Several witnesses testified. However, 
in the middle of the prosecution case, the attorney general ordered that the charges be 
withdrawn. 
 
Kigen’s brother told Human Rights Watch, “I went once to testify about the post-mortem 
which I had observed. The rest of the hearings I didn’t hear about, and then … I was 
astonished to see the accused walking around. I never got an explanation.” Kigen’s family 
also never received the compensation that the government provided to some victims of 
post-election violence.149 
 
In Kitale, two robbery with violence cases were brought before the court, but one was 
withdrawn because the complainants failed to appear in court; the other, a mob attack, 
resulted in an acquittal due to lack of specific evidence against the two suspects who had 
been apprehended.150 
 
Convictions in High-Profile and Serious Cases 
The refrain often heard from Kenyans frustrated with ongoing impunity is that “No one has 
been convicted in Kenya for post-election violence.” This is not quite true; there have been 
at least six successful convictions for relatively serious crimes, in some cases due to solid 
police investigations and assiduous work on the part of prosecutors. But convictions are 
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few and far between, serving as the exception that proves the rule. The only serious crimes 
for which Human Rights Watch was able to document convictions are the following.151 Most 
involve ODM-affiliated suspects, and one of two murder convictions is for the killing of 
police officers. PNU-affiliated suspects, and police officers whom themselves committed 
crimes, are largely absent from the short list of convictions.  
 
1. Republic v. Robert Kipngetich Kemboi and Kirkland Kipngeno Langat: The Killing of 
Police Officers Peter Githinji and David Odhiambo152 
In one of the few post-election violence-related murder cases that resulted in a conviction, 
Robert Kemboi and Kirkland Langat were convicted in the murder of two police officers, 
Peter Githinji and David Odhiambo in Bureti district, on December 31, 2007. 
 
Githinji and Odhiambo were escorting the vehicle of a private citizen, Paul Kirui Wachira, 
from Kisii to Kericho when they encountered a mob at Roret, a trading center in Bureti. The 
mob stoned the vehicle and its passengers. Wachira was knocked unconscious. Githinji 
and Odhiambo were killed, their firearms stolen in the course of the attack. 
 
Two suspects—Kemboi and Langat—were caught the following day. They were part of a 
mob that attempted to attack the home of local politician Richard Cheruiyot. Cheruiyot’s 
supporters caught four members of the mob and locked them in a room in Cheruiyot’s 
compound. After Cheruiyot released them, he found one of the stolen firearms stashed in 
the room, leading to the arrest of two of the men who had been confined there. A mobile 
phone belonging to Wachira was also traced to Kemboi. Kemboi did not offer a reasonable 
explanation as to how he had come into possession of the phone. 
 
The judge found that circumstantial evidence, based on links between the two suspects 
and the guns and cell phone taken from the scene, was sufficient to convict them of 
murder, and sentenced them to death. President Kibaki subsequently converted all death 
sentences to life imprisonment.153 An appeal filed by the accused is pending before the 
Appeals Court at Nakuru.  
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2. Republic v. John Kimita Mwaniki154 
The June 2011 conviction of John Kimita Mwaniki of murder stands out as the only election-
related murder conviction of a Kikuyu. The murder for which Kimita was convicted was 
committed on November 27, 2007, and the case does not figure on the various police and 
Department of Public Prosecutions lists. However, the murder took place in the context of 
pronounced pre-election violence between Kikuyus and Kalenjins in Molo, Rift Valley 
province, where at least 10 people were killed in the lead-up to the elections. Kimita was 
convicted of being part of a group that killed Rose Chemutai and two five year old boys, 
Reuben Kipn’geno and Shadrack Kipkoech. Witnesses testified that they saw Kimita with a 
gun during the attack, accompanied by other men wielding machetes. Two victims died 
from gunshot wounds, while the third died from a cut to the head. The accused provided 
contradictory testimony regarding his alleged whereabouts the day of the attack. He was 
convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. He has since appealed his conviction; 
appeal proceedings are ongoing at this writing. 
 
3. Republic v. Charles Kipkumi Chepkwony155 
While not a high-profile case, this is one of only three known convictions for the serious 
crime of robbery with violence. Chepkwony was convicted in May 2009 of being part of a 
group that attacked Wilson Soi Wanyama and his family and stole their cattle in Kipkelion 
District on January 28, 2008. At trial, Wanyama, who was shot with an arrow during the 
attack and survived, and several other family members testified that they had recognized 
Chepkwony, a neighbor, among the mob. Chepkwony’s appeal was dismissed in November 
2010.156 
 
4. Republic v. James Mbugua Ndungu and Raymond Munene Kamau157 
During the post-election violence, groups of men carried out a series of sexual and gender-
based attacks. Some groups were attacking and undressing women who wore trousers 
(rather than skirts). The men carrying out such attacks may have been affiliated with 
Mungiki, whose traditional ideology, by some accounts, included a prohibition on women 
wearing trousers.158 
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In Naivasha, two men, James Mbugua Ndungu and Raymond Munene Kamau, were 
convicted of robbery with violence—but acquitted of attempted rape—in a case in which 
they were charged of removing a woman’s trousers, touching her genitals, and stealing her 
money. The judge ruled that there was no evidence they had intended to rape the victim.  
 
5. Republic v. Willy Kipngeno Rotich and 7 Others159 
In the only other conviction Human Rights Watch identified for robbery with violence, the 
crime in question was less serious than many that took place during the post-election 
violence. Willy Kipngeno Rotich and seven other men were convicted of robbing cash and 
other property from a victim in Sotik, while threatening to use violence. The suspects were 
known to the complainant and his wife, and were arrested immediately after the incident. 
Human Rights Watch was unable to ascertain their sentence based on the court file. 
 
6. Republic v. Peter Ochieng 
According to a police prosecutor interviewed by Human Rights Watch, in Nakuru, Peter 
Ochieng, a Luo, was convicted of grievous harm and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. 
He was accused of setting fire to his wife, a Kikuyu, during the post-election violence. His 
wife survived the attack.160 
 
Cases Pending Before the Courts 
Few significant post-election violence cases remain pending before the courts. Human 
Rights Watch was able to identify two pending murder cases related to the post-election 
violence, one pending inquest, and one pending rape case, although there may be other 
pending cases in jurisdictions where Human Rights Watch did not conduct research.  
 
Republic v. Joseph Lokuret Nabanyi is a murder case pending before the Nakuru High Court. 
The suspect was charged with being part of a mob that stoned to death Zezia Wangui 
Karanja, an elderly Kikuyu woman, on January 28, 2008.161 Several prosecution witnesses 
have testified; at this writing the case was scheduled for its next hearing on November 30, 
at which the final prosecution witness was scheduled to testify.162 
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A murder case in Timbaroa, Republic v. Peter Kepkemboi, also remains pending.163 
Kepkemboi is accused of being part of a group that shot Kamau Kimani Thiongo, a Kikuyu, 
in the head with an arrow. The prosecution finished its case in October 2011 and was 
awaiting a ruling, due November 25, on whether the defense has a case to answer. The 
prosecutor spoke highly of the police investigations into this case, including their role in 
seeking an order to exhume the body, which had been buried without a post-mortem.164 
 
In Molo, there is a pending inquest into the killing of Nahashon Mburu, who was killed with 
an axe on January 9, 2008, an incident that triggered a series of further killings in Molo. 
Four eyewitnesses have testified in court that the man wielding the axe was Thomas 
Belsoi.165 Belsoi has not, however, been formally charged with the crime, and hearings are 
ongoing.166  
 
Another murder case included in the Department of Public Prosecutions list is Republic v. 
James Omondi Odera and Three Others, regarding the killing of newly elected ODM 
Member of Parliament Melitus Mugabe Were, shot in Nairobi on January 29, 2008. Were 
was the first leading politician to die amid the post-election violence, and ODM 
immediately called the killing a political assassination.167 However, a prosecutor involved 
with the case said there was no evidence that the killing was related to the elections, and 
Human Rights Watch consultation of the court file suggested the killing was related to an 
attempted robbery or a deal gone wrong.168  
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over once again with a new judge. 
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A rape case, Republic v. Paul Muigai Mwihia, was also pending as of this writing. Mwihia 
was charged with being part of a group that gang raped a woman in Nakuru district and 
assaulted her husband with machetes during the election violence.169  
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IV. Weaknesses in Investigations and Prosecutions 
 
The case [for the killing of Benedict Omolo] was thrown out because of 
shoddy investigations. So many things were missing. For most of the PEV 
[post-election violence] cases that is the problem. But poor investigations 
are not just a problem in PEV cases.… The investigating officers [IOs] are not 
well-trained. They don’t know the ingredients of a crime.… In many cases, 
IO’s are compromised [bribed], and they claim the witnesses can’t be found. 
The IO’s then go to the state counsels and tell them the case has to be 
withdrawn pending investigations.  
 
… There was a problem of a lack of witnesses, or that witnesses relocated.… 
Some could not be found. But the police usually didn’t even try to trace 
them.  
 
There are cases where IOs don’t even show up in court, and the prosecutor 
tells me “I have no witnesses.” So what do you do? Sometimes you know 
you’re releasing the wrong person, but you’ve given the prosecutor three 
chances, and the file and the witnesses are not there. 
—Magistrate in Eldoret170 
 
The investigation and credible prosecution of crimes committed during mass atrocity poses 
challenges for any jurisdiction. The judicial system may be overwhelmed by the number of 
crimes. It may lack specialized laws and expertise to deal with international crimes or even 
serious ordinary crimes committed on a mass scale. And the political will to address these 
challenges and bring to justice those responsible for mass atrocity is often lacking.  
 
Human Rights Watch examined 76 cases brought before Kenyan courts, including the 
majority of the serious cases listed in the March 2011 Department of Public Prosecutions 
report, as well as a few cases not in the report for which initial information was provided by 
other sources. At least 20 of those cases sourced from the report were clearly not related 
to the post-election violence; for another nine, any relation to the post-election violence 
was unclear from information available to Human Rights Watch. Of the remaining 47 cases 
that were clearly or likely related to the post-election violence, 16 resulted in acquittals; 16 
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were withdrawn; one was closed pending the arrest of a suspect; and one was “dismissed” 
(it was unclear whether this was an acquittal or a withdrawal). Five were pending before 
the courts as of November 2011. Only eight had resulted in convictions. These files 
encompass the majority of serious crimes listed within the March 2011 Department of 
Public Prosecutions report, as well as several petty crimes, including stealing and 
incitement to violence. Human Rights Watch researchers consulted the case files and 
interviewed lawyers, judges, police officers, and Kenyan civil society activists familiar with 
the cases. Researchers also interviewed dozens of other victims whose cases stalled at the 
police investigations stage, never reaching the courts.  
 
Based on this research, Human Rights Watch has identified a number of across-the-board 
weaknesses in Kenya’s policing and judicial systems that contributed to a low rate of 
convictions. These include poor police investigations, inaccurate or incomplete 
qualification of charges, an ailing police prosecutorial system, and overburdened state 
counsel. Other factors include interference by politicians, affecting police, prosecutors, 
and defense lawyers; judges’ errors in evaluating evidence; and the lack of a viable 
witness protection system. In addition, the absence of adequate legal frameworks and 
expertise to prosecute at least some of the post-election violence as “international” crimes 
(such as crimes against humanity), discussed below, may have been a factor in the limited 
number of cases targeting those who organized the violence. 
 
Many of these problems are not unique to the investigation and prosecution of post-
election violence; they inhibit access to justice for a broad spectrum of crimes. Some of 
these issues are being addressed by a series of reforms driven by the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act and the new constitution, while others remain unaddressed.  
 
Poor Investigations by Police 
Poor investigations were the principal explanation cited by interlocutors as to why post-
election violence cases failed to advance. 
 
Problems with police investigations often began the moment that victims filed complaints. 
The Waki Commission heard shocking testimony such as: “In some cases police just told 
complainants they should be grateful that they are alive and forget what happened.”171 
Other victims, particularly of sexual violence, were turned away from police stations if they 
could not identify the perpetrator by name.172 
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Where police arrested suspects, they often conducted no further investigations to seek 
witnesses. One defense lawyer, who won acquittals for a number of his clients, told 
Human Rights Watch, “All the [prosecution] witnesses were police officers. They didn’t do 
any investigations to get evidence.”173 Another confirmed, “Most of the cases were 
acquitted because there were no investigations.”174 
 
The police’s apparent inability to carry out successful investigations is partly due to a lack 
of trust on the part of the population. This is particularly acute in areas where police are 
perceived as a branch of the ruling party. A senior police official in Kisumu told Human 
Rights Watch, “Here in Western and Nyanza [provinces], people don’t give information 
about crime. People are used to being in the opposition, and they receive government 
officials negatively.”175  
 
Human Rights Watch spoke to some victims who believed that police failed to investigate 
cases because they were not impartial.176 A police officer in the Rift Valley, who shared this 
view, told Human Rights Watch, “Most police here at that time came from the area. They 
had ethnic solidarity with the accused. Some were sent to the scene of a crime where one 
of their own had committed a crime, and didn’t do anything.”177 Worse, police in some 
cases may have informed alleged perpetrators that victims had filed complaints against 
them. One victim told Human Rights Watch that he was threatened with a hammer by a 
Mungiki member, known to him by name, in Njoro. After he reported the incident at the 
Njoro police station, he said, he learned from friends that the police had informed the 
Mungiki member of the complaint, without taking action to investigate it. He concluded: 
“In Kenya I have lost trust in the justice system. You take someone to court and then he 
comes back to threaten you.”178 
 
Human Rights Watch also found cases in which police appeared to conduct minimum 
investigations. In a Kericho gang rape and assault case, a police officer testified that a 
desire to “avoid confrontation” led to only two alleged perpetrators being arrested, despite 
the fact that others were named by the victims:  
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We had other names but I was instructed to arrest only the two… even 
arresting the two suspects was a problem for us because the villagers were 
preventing us from arresting anybody. We had to sneak off the two accused 
whom we managed to lay hands on. We never went back to arrest more. 
There was violence all over the district.… We avoided confrontation with the 
villagers because of the post-election violence.179 
 
Although the trial took place a year after violence subsided, police never went back to 
carry out further arrests. 
 
In the absence of a complaint, police were particularly negligent in their duty to carry out 
assiduous investigations even if an obvious crime had been committed.180 Attorney 
General Amos Wako promised that investigations would be carried out based on the 
conclusions of the Waki report.181 However, the report resulted in no new investigations. 
One police official told Human Rights Watch that the police needed official complaints in 
order to open investigations and could not rely on the Waki report, reflecting an inaccurate 
understanding of police responsibilities.182 
 
In other cases the police simply appear incompetent. For instance, in two gang rape cases, 
police failed to organize “identification parades” (or line-ups).183 Kenyan legal precedent 
suggests that convictions are much more difficult to win when an identification parade is 
not held.184  
 
Even in fairly simple theft cases related to the election violence, police often failed to 
compile sufficient proof. In a theft case in Mombasa, a witness told the Waki Commission 
that although he provided police with video footage showing identifiable individuals 
looting his shops, the suspects were never arrested.185 
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One police officer told Human Rights Watch that poor investigations were often the result 
of a lack of resources, such as dedicated vehicles for investigators.186 Several police and 
judicial officials also stressed the need for an adequate forensics laboratory for DNA 
testing. Currently, all DNA testing is done at the government chemist, an office which lacks 
trained personnel and technical equipment and is plagued by backlogs.187  
 
In at least one arson case, prosecution could not proceed because police never turned 
over their investigation file to the prosecutor.188 
 
Inaccurate or Incomplete Qualifications of Charges 
Police are responsible for filing charges against suspects, which requires knowledge of the 
criminal code. It also entails a strategy of listing less serious charges to fall back on in 
case the evidence is insufficient to win a conviction on the most serious charges. 
Unfortunately, many in the police are not up to the task, in part because of inadequate 
training. According to an Eldoret police official, “It’s a blame game between the courts and 
police. Sometimes the police lay the wrong charge and the court dismisses the case. Police 
are supposed to put alternative charges for every case. We try to train investigators on this. 
Investigators are trained, but it may not be enough.”189 
 
In some cases, the charges filed were insufficient given the gravity of the crime. This was 
most problematic in “robbery with violence” cases. Inexplicably, several killings related to 
the election violence, including the killings of Benedict Omolo and Elias Wafula in Eldoret 
and the killing of Hassan Omar Dado in Kericho, were qualified solely as “robbery with 
violence” despite clear indications that the killings were intentional and should have been 
qualified as murder. The mistake is not inconsequential: murder cases are prosecuted by 
trained lawyers before the High Court, whereas most robbery with violence cases are tried 
by insufficiently trained police prosecutors before magistrate’s courts. 
 
Another problem in the filing of charges is that charges were sometimes only brought 
against one alleged perpetrator, even when witnesses named multiple suspects. In a 
robbery with violence case in Kericho, Charles Kipkumi Chepkwony was convicted in 2009 
on charges of attacking Wilson Soi Wanyama in 2008. But another suspect named by at 
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least two witnesses was not arrested, and as far as can be ascertained from court records, 
police prosecutors never requested a warrant for his arrest.190  
 
Cases that are Pending Arrest of Known Suspect  
Dozens of cases remain classified as “pending arrest of known suspect.” Both Department 
of Public Prosecutions reports indicate that the team received incomplete information from 
police on the progress in such cases. Local human rights organizations told Human Rights 
Watch that they suspected police made little effort to arrest these suspects, some of whom 
made themselves scarce in 2008, just after committing acts of violence, but many of whom 
may have since returned to their homes.191 
 
Ailing Police Prosecutorial System, Overburdened State Counsel 
The police prosecutorial system in Kenya constitutes a major obstacle to justice. As of June 
2011 Kenya had only 83 civilian prosecutors nationwide, compared to 360 police 
prosecutors.192 Police prosecuted the majority of cases—those heard at the magistrate 
court level—whereas civilian prosecutors, who are trained lawyers, generally only tried 
high court cases. Director of Public Prosecutions Keriako Tobiko has recognized the 
magnitude of this problem, pointing out that police prosecutors “do not have the requisite 
legal training to handle complex cases.”193 Legal training for police prosecutors currently 
consists solely of a few modules taught in the police academy.194 In terms of formal 
education, some police prosecutors have completed no more than a Standard 7 (the 
seventh year of primary school).195 
 
The effect is inadequate representation of complainants. In court, police prosecutors often 
fail to present the evidence required to prove a charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Human 
Rights Watch found several cases, including cases of serious crimes such as assault, in 
which police prosecutors failed to secure the presence of key witnesses—including fellow 
police officers—in court.196 In some cases police prosecutors failed to produce any 
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witnesses to the court, including the complainant.197 They also inadequately prepared the 
evidence, resulting in contradictory testimony. In Kericho, a suspect was acquitted of 
malicious damage to a house because a police inspector who took photos of the damaged 
house testified in court that he had taken the photos on January 28, while the victim 
testified that the damage did not occur until February 9.198 A stealing case in Eldoret was 
also lost because prosecution witnesses provided conflicting dates of the offense to the 
court.199 Other cases were withdrawn due to police prosecutors’ carelessness, as in two 
theft cases in Eldoret and Sotik where charges were withdrawn after the prosecutors 
misplaced the police file.200 
 
The shortage of trained civilian prosecutors means that while one set of cases is 
prosecuted poorly in the Magistrate’s Courts, another set of cases—the most serious cases, 
mostly murder—is handled by overburdened state counsel. State counsel have a much 
higher level of training than their counterparts in the police prosecution service. However, 
like police prosecutors, they do not have the time or resources to carry out their own 
investigations, relying exclusively on the police file which is an obstacle to justice.201 Their 
workload inhibits efficacy: according to one lawyer, “They don’t even have time to go 
through the [police] files unless it’s a sensational case.”202  
 
The training of additional civilian prosecutors is an urgent priority to meet Kenya’s justice 
needs. It is unclear, however, whether it is a priority for the country’s political class. 
Director of Public Prosecutions Tobiko told Human Rights Watch he has requested 
additional funding for the chronically underfunded State Law Office, and is awaiting a 
response.203 According to an Eldoret lawyer, “Replacing police with lawyers has not taken 
off. The major hindrance is political. Our politicians don’t want change. They want the 
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police to remain as it is so that they can get away with things.”204 The burden rests on 
politicians to demonstrate otherwise. 
 
Lack of Witness Protection 
The lack of a functioning witness protection system is a fundamental obstacle in the 
search for justice for post-election violence. Given the number of suspected perpetrators 
who occupy influential positions in the state apparatus, including police and politicians, 
witnesses have a reasonable fear of repercussions for giving testimony. As the 
International Center for Transitional Justice’s (ICTJ) former Kenya Director Njonjo Mue put it, 
Kenya is plagued by “the history of our criminal justice system where witnesses to historic 
events such as these keep disappearing.”205 
 
Since 2006, Kenya has made progress in developing legislation on witness protection, but 
the legislation has not translated into action. One such legislation is the Witness 
Protection (Amendment) Act of 2010, which created a Witness Protection Agency, 
improving on a 2006 act by making the agency fully independent of the attorney general’s 
office. Its mandate is “to provide the framework and procedures for giving special 
protection, on behalf of the State, to persons in possession of important information and 
who are facing potential risk or intimidation due to their cooperation with prosecution or 
other law enforcement agencies.”206 
 
The law is well crafted, and the agency it proposes has far-reaching powers. But the 
government has allocated only a fraction of the funding requested by the agency, not even 
enough to cover basic operations.207 To one lawyer, this is evidence of a lack of political 
will: “Even now, the Witness Protection Act only exists on paper. Only the government can 
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put it into effect, but the government is guilty as hell. There is a deliberate attempt to 
cushion some people who are high up—so the government may keep delaying 
implementation of this act.”208 
 
In order to address post-election violence within the Kenyan judicial system, funding the 
Witness Protection Agency is an obvious priority. But many Kenyans question the agency’s 
ability to adequately protect witnesses at all, given Kenya’s history of attacks on witnesses 
that are attributed to the very security agencies that in principle should play a role in 
protecting them.209 The police commissioner sits on the agency’s board; while the board 
need not be privy to sensitive information held by the agency, one civil society activist 
questioned the wisdom of any role for the police commissioner in witness protection, 
given the number of cases likely to arise involving police as perpetrators.210 
 
Absent a credible witness protection program, many victims and witnesses fear 
repercussions for testifying in post-election violence cases. One lawyer explained: “People 
are afraid to testify… [they fear they] will be abducted. The police don’t do anything to 
protect witnesses.”211 In Kisumu, the father of two victims of police shootings told Human 
Rights Watch that while he would be willing to testify, “Others would be afraid to come and 
testify because they are afraid they could be killed.”212  
 
Potential witnesses were concerned not only for their physical security but also for their 
economic security. A local government official whose brother was killed by police said that 
although he would be willing to testify before a special mechanism, he would fear the 
consequences: “If you’re a civil servant you’re not supposed to accuse the government of 
anything. The following day you might get a letter and be told that you’ve been sacked.”213 
 
Law Enforcement Officials under Political Pressure  
The police, the attorney general’s office, and local state prosecutors all succumbed to 
political pressure in their treatment of post-election violence cases.214 A defense lawyer 
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said he and his colleagues also experienced pressure: “There was pressure from both 
sides. As defense counsel, we were getting threats from the security forces. There was 
pressure at the national level for convictions, and pressure at the local level for 
acquittals.”215 In the North Rift, it seems, the pressure at the local level won the day—
though it was not exclusively local, but compounded by national pressure, including from 
Prime Minister Raila Odinga.216 A Kalenjin elder in Eldoret confirmed, “If someone ‘up 
there’ calls the [local police chief], the person is released.”217  
 
In various locations, political pressure led police to free suspects. Former Nyanza 
Provincial Police Officer Grace Kaindi testified before the Waki Commission that after she 
arrested several Kisiis suspected of assaulting ODM politicians in the lead-up to the 
elections, Police Commissioner Ali phoned and instructed her to free them.218 In Nakuru, 
the Officer Commanding Station (OCS), Mohamed Bakuli, ordered the release of a chief, 
who had been arrested after threatening to attack police officers who were carrying out 
another arrest.219 According to a Nakuru lawyer, Bakuli himself had received instructions 
from a former MP to release the chief.220 An Eldoret police official explained, “Political 
interference is there—especially in a place like this. Politicians will remove you [if you 
don’t handle a case as they want].”221 In Sotik, one Kalenjin resident told Human Rights 
Watch, “I went to a meeting in Litein with councilors who were inciting people to kill Kisiis. 
Those councilors were arrested and taken to court, but later released.”222 The Waki report 
found police released them because of a “rowdy crowd” outside the police station.223  
 
The failure to successfully prosecute a single one of the many local politicians suspected 
of being involved in the violence is also indicative of political pressure. There was no 
shortage of accusations against local political power brokers of both parties following the 
violence. Most such well-protected individuals were never investigated or arrested. 
Kericho area residents told Human Rights Watch that a then district commissioner of a 
nearby district himself shot and killed several young men who were protesting, but that 
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there were no investigations into his alleged role in the killings.224 Similarly the Waki report 
gives evidence according to which a member of parliament from Coast Province “funded 
the youth to loot and burn all businesses belonging to non ODM members.” As far as 
Human Rights Watch could ascertain, this claim was never investigated.225 
 
In the rare cases in which local politicians were arrested, such as Farouk Kibet in Eldoret 
and David Manyara in Nakuru, they were promptly released.226. Manyara, a former MP, was 
arrested on April 19, 2008, alongside prominent businessman Zakayo Maina, and accused 
of sponsoring Mungiki activities during the violence.227 Police requested they be bonded to 
keep peace. When their lawyers indicated they would object in court to the detention of 
their clients without sufficient evidence, Manyara and Maina were freed, after two days in 
custody.228 The case remained open for several months but was eventually withdrawn.229 
Oddly, according to a lawyer, the Manyara file has disappeared from the Nakuru courts.230 
 
The government’s reluctance to prosecute Mungiki members may be linked to the 
complicity of senior Kikuyu politicians with Mungiki, as alleged in the ICC case against 
Uhuru Kenyatta, Francis Muthaura, and Hussein Ali. In 2009, Attorney General Wako 
withdrew charges against Mungiki leader Maina Njenga for the killings of 29 people 
(unrelated to the post-election violence), just three days after Njenga threatened to 
publish an affidavit that “would bare all and include names of senior people in 
government” who allegedly had dealings with Mungiki.231 
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Political pressure in addressing the post-election violence played out on a scale larger 
than that of individual cases. Before the 2010 constitution was promulgated, the attorney 
general’s office had ultimate control over initiating and ending prosecutions. The attorney 
general had the authority to require police to carry out investigations into any alleged 
offense. He also had the authority to withdraw any prosecution initiated by police, a 
provincial state law office, or private citizens, in a motion known as a nolle prosequi, and 
was not required to provide any explanation. This power, in the hands of a political 
appointee, was easily abused to protect impunity. Indeed, Wako, who served from 1991 to 
2011, has a long history of withdrawing cases against politically powerful individuals.232 
 
In mid-2008, Wako ordered the withdrawal of dozens of post-election violence cases, 
without any explanation. Most cases involved suspects who were in custody, and most 
alleged perpetrators were Kalenjin or Luo. Many were for minor crimes that did not involve 
physical violence against other persons, such as rioting or looting, but more serious cases, 
including at least one robbery with violence case, were also among those withdrawn. 
According to a Kericho lawyer, the cases were withdrawn not for lack of evidence, but for 
political reasons, including a PNU decision to extend an olive branch to ODM in the name 
of national reconciliation.233 A member of the Waki Commission told Human Rights Watch 
of a cabinet meeting held in June 2008 at which a “secret decision” was made to release 
ODM suspects.234 Victims in the cases, evidently, had no say in this political decision.235 
 
Judges’ Errors in Evaluating Evidence and Premature Dismissal of Charges  
Those interviewed by Human Rights Watch on the lack of convictions for election violence 
were less likely to fault the judiciary than they were to fault police investigators and 
prosecutors. However, the judiciary is not exempt from criticism in its handling of certain 
cases.  
 
In an Eldoret stealing case, a magistrate acquitted a suspect simply because the two 
eyewitnesses provided different dates in their testimony as to when the theft took place. 
The acquittal reflects the poor preparation of cases by police prosecutors, but that alone 
                                                          
232 See, for instance, AfriCOG, “Poisoned Legacy,” August 2011.  
233 Human Rights Watch interview with a lawyer, Kericho, August 24, 2011. 
234 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a member of the Waki Commission, September 5, 2011. 
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should not necessarily have resulted in an acquittal; the magistrate could have sought 
clarification as to the date from the witnesses or the prosecutor.236  
 
Even where evidence presented by police or state counsel was insufficient, the courts 
rarely, if ever, exercised their prerogative to order further investigations.237 For instance, 
the judge in the Kiambaa church burning case complained that police did not seem to 
carry out investigations into the planning of the attack. But he did not summon any 
perpetrators mentioned by witnesses who had not already been arrested, or any additional 
witnesses who might shed light on the issue.  
 
In a Nakuru murder case, Republic v. Bernard Kibet Bii, Matthew Kipsang Chirchir, and 
Kennedy Sayayo Rungera, a judge dismissed the charges when the witnesses failed to 
appear in court on the second hearing date.238 According to a lawyer familiar with the case, 
this was inappropriate, as the judge never even summoned the police, who are 
responsible for ensuring that witnesses appear in court. The judge also did not take into 
account the difficulty of securing transport for witnesses, particularly in the immediate 
aftermath of the post-election violence, when hundreds of thousands of Kenyans were 
displaced. According to the lawyer, the case should be reopened and earnest efforts 
undertaken to seek the witnesses.239 
 
Similarly, a judge in Naivasha acquitted the suspect in an attempted rape case because 
after three adjournments, the police file had not been presented in court. There was no 
evidence in the file to suggest that the judge had summoned the investigating officer or his 
or her immediate superior to determine the whereabouts of the file.240 
 
Corruption 
Several sources told Human Rights Watch that corruption was also at play in the issuing of 
nolle prosequi, with one lawyer claiming that at a location in the Rift Valley, “nolles were 
on sale, 50,000 [Kenyan shillings] per nolle.”241 A police official and a magistrate in Eldoret 
also pointed to corruption as a factor that may have inhibited successful police 
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investigations.242 However, none of these sources were able to point to specific post-
election violence cases that were blocked due to bribery or other forms of corruption. Their 
allegations point to a need for further investigations as to the role of corruption in post-
election violence cases, and its role in the criminal justice system more generally.  
 
Absence of Legal Framework and Expertise to Prosecute International Crimes 
Kenya ratified the Rome Statute in 2005. But at the time of the post-election violence in 
2007-2008, ICC crimes—that is, crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity—had not yet been criminalized in national legislation, and therefore could not 
be prosecuted as such in Kenyan courts. One of the more positive developments to emerge 
from debate around the creation of a special tribunal was the passage of the International 
Crimes Act (ICA), 2008, which made these ICC crimes triable offenses in Kenya. The ICA 
explicitly integrates into Kenyan law provisions of the Rome Statute related to command 
responsibility, a principle by which those in a position of authority who should have known 
of crimes committed by those under their command, and who failed to prevent these 
crimes or ensure their prosecution, are themselves criminally liable.243 
 
The act came into operation on January 1, 2009. The Kenyan constitution at the time 
prohibited in section 77(4) the retrospective application of criminal law, meaning no 
person could be convicted for conduct that did not constitute a crime at the time it was 
committed, known as the principle of nullum crimen. It is unclear whether this would have 
prohibited use of the International Crimes Act, however, given that ICC crimes were clearly 
crimes under international law, if not under national law, during the post-election violence 
period.244 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Kenya is a party, 
makes clear that the principle of nullum crimen is not violated where conduct constituted a 
crime under either national or international law at the time it was committed.245 The new 
Kenyan constitution, promulgated in August 2010, follows this approach.246  
 
                                                          
242 Human Rights Watch interviews, Eldoret, May 23 and May 26, 2011.  
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This would appear to clear the way for use of the International Crimes Act now to prosecute 
crimes against humanity or other ICC crimes dating to the post-election violence period. 
But the absence of these crimes in national law over the course of 2008 coincided with the 
most concerted efforts to bring accountability. This deprived police and prosecutors of a 
key tool, particularly with regard to investigation of high-level perpetrators. Even as of 2011, 
most police investigators and prosecutors have received no training on the International 
Crimes Act, inhibiting their ability to make use of it in newly filed cases.247 
 
Serious crimes committed during mass atrocity may be tried as ordinary crimes, for 
example, by bringing multiple charges of murder or rape. But this often does not 
adequately capture the conduct and level of responsibility of those involved in their 
commission. Large-scale rights violations are generally characterized by a division of labor 
between planners and implementers, as well as a structure designed to make connections 
between these two levels difficult to pinpoint.248 Prosecuting these violations as crimes 
against humanity, for example, which requires evidence of a widespread or systematic 
attack conducted pursuant to a state or organization policy, can expose the criminal 
structure that led to mass violations and lead to additional prosecutions of others in that 
structure. Failure to do so can lead to impunity for those most responsible at the top.  
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V. Impunity for Police Shootings and Misconduct 
 
During the post-election violence police fatally shot at least 405 people.249 Hundreds of 
other Kenyans were shot by police but survived.250 With the exception of the convictions of 
Ben Pkiech Loyatum and Andrew Moeche Omwenga, discussed above—cases apparently 
unrelated to the election violence—no one has been convicted for the shootings. 
 
Shootings by police took place throughout Kenya in areas viewed as ODM strongholds, 
including in Eldoret and surrounding towns in the North Rift; Kericho and surrounding 
towns in the South Rift; throughout Nyanza and Western provinces; in Mombasa town; and 
in informal settlements in Nairobi.251 Human Rights Watch researched the shootings in 
January 2008 and collected testimony to the effect that police had instituted a “shoot to 
kill” policy, authorizing indiscriminate firing on protestors.252 Police acknowledged that the 
shootings did occur, but denied that a “shoot to kill” policy existed.253 However, the notion 
of individual blame has never been tested by police investigations and prosecutions of 
individual perpetrators among the security forces, an omission that diminishes the 
credibility of police protestations of institutional innocence.  
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Most shootings were unlawful under both Kenyan and international law.254 A large number 
of gunshot victims during the post-election violence were shot in the back, while running 
away from police or from rioting.255 According to Kenya’s Police Act, police may use arms 
“against any person who by force prevents or attempts to prevent the arrest of himself or 
another person” but arms may not be used under those circumstances “unless the officer 
has reasonable ground to believe that he or any other person is in danger of grievous 
bodily harm or that he cannot otherwise prevent the rescue or, as the case may be, effect 
the arrest”—not the case in many of the election violence shootings.256 Further, Kenya’s 
law is overly broad: shooting a suspect simply because a police officer cannot otherwise 
“effect the arrest” is prohibited under United Nations standards.257  
 
Many victims filed complaints with the police after shootings, while others, reluctant to 
complain to the same institution that was perpetrating abuses, took their complaints to 
local administrative officials, members of parliament, NGOs, or others whom they thought 
could assist them in accessing justice. A lawyer in Kericho, where most police shooting 
victims were Kalenjin, explained to Human Rights Watch that after police fired on unarmed 
protestors, killing at least seven, few were willing to file complaints. The lawyer explained, 
“They [the police] were so hostile that the local community could not make any reports. 
They would be told, ‘You are the perpetrators.’”258 
 
Refusal to Take Reports 
Difficulty in accessing justice for police shootings began as soon as victims attempted to 
file complaints. Many such victims were turned away, as Human Rights Watch documented 
in Sotik, Litein, Kisumu, Vihiga, Eldoret, Mombasa, and Nairobi. The problem was also 
documented by the Waki Commission.259 
 
In Kisumu, Daniel Ishuga Indimuli attempted to file a report after police shot two of his 
children, including an 11-year-old girl. He said, “I went to the police and said ‘The police 
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killed my child.’ They said ‘The police don’t kill people.’ They refused to write a statement. 
When I insisted, they said ‘If you continue to play around, you could be shot, too.’”260 
 
Ishuga waited two years, and then returned to the police in 2010 when he learned that 
neighbors had received compensation for their losses. He explained that his children had 
been killed by police, on two separate occasions during the post-election violence, and 
that further, his properties had been looted by mobs of civilians. Rather than filling out 
separate incident reports for the three separate incidents, police listed all incidents on a 
form titled “Properties Stolen or Destroyed.” The form listed a number of household items 
that had been looted, such as a bed, chairs, and utensils. Toward the bottom of the list of 
missing items, the police also noted “Two children.”261 The police carried out no further 
investigations. 
 
Also in Kisumu, police shot 18-year-old Michael Otieno in the leg during protests on 
January 17. Complications led to the amputation of Otieno’s left leg below the knee. When 
he was finally discharged from hospital two years later, he attempted to make a police 
report. According to Otieno,  
 
I went to make a report in Kondele when I got out of the hospital. The OCS 
[Officer Commanding Station] told me that he can’t deal with a case like 
this. He refused to take a report. I had brought my documents from the 
hospital. The OCS didn’t even read my documents; he said “These kinds of 
cases I can’t do.”262 
 
Gregory Ngoche was shot by police while sitting in his yard on January 17. Protests were 
underway in the street outside and he was hit by what he believes was a stray bullet. He 
explained to Human Rights Watch: “The first police officer in the station refused to take the 
report, but the OCS came in and ordered him to take it.”263 Although Ngoche finally 
managed to make a complaint, no further action was taken by the police. 
 
In Sotik, such stories were also common.264 One man told Human Rights Watch: 
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I live in Chebilat Manaret town. On January 13, 2008, I was shot in the leg by 
the police.… My house is on the roadside. Police were shooting at the 
crowd, but they shot me directly. They were Kenya Police from Sotik police 
station. The one who shot me is called Waweru. The other police, who took 
me to the hospital, said “Waweru shot you.” 
 
I came to the police station here and made a report after two months in 
hospital. I also went to KNCHR in Nairobi to report. After one year, I went 
back to the police station to ask for the [Occurrence Book] number.… The 
officer refused to give it after I told him it was about me being shot by 
Waweru. He told me to come back the next day, and then told me my 
complaint was lost. He told me I could make another statement, but I didn’t, 
because I felt it wouldn’t help.265 
 
One man, shot in the arm during the violence by a police officer whom he recognized, tried 
to file a complaint at three different area police stations. Each station told him that they 
“were not dealing with” this kind of case, sending him on to other stations. Finally, he was 
able to record a statement. Police later told him that the inspector who shot him had been 
transferred. The inspector was never arrested or charged with the shooting.266  
 
Many victims of rape at the hands of the police reported police failure to take their 
statements.267 A woman who was raped by a police officer in Nairobi told the Waki 
Commission that when she went to Kilimani police station to file a report, police officers 
told her she was to blame for the rape.268 
  
Failure to Investigate Complaints 
Even where police did receive written statements from victims of police shootings, they did 
not appear to undertake any subsequent investigations.  
 
In Vihiga, Western province, one woman heard from witnesses that a female police officer 
in Mbale had shot her husband six times in the head and neck. Only one female officer 
was working in Mbale at that time, leaving no question as to the perpetrator’s identity. The 
victim’s widow told Human Rights Watch, “I told the police that my husband was shot by 
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that lady. They wrote it down. The OCS [in Mbale] was there when we gave the report. They 
said ‘Wait for investigations.’ But they didn’t do investigations.”269 
 
The brother of a fatal police shooting victim in Chavakali, also in Western province, told 
Human Rights Watch that when he reported the case to the police, the OCS at Mbale said, 
“Your brother wanted to loot, and that’s why we killed him.”270 Though an inquest file was 
opened into the killing, police later told the victim’s brother that the file had been closed.  
 
A Kisumu police official told Human Rights Watch that some guns were taken by CID for 
ballistics examination.271 It is not clear whether the tests ever took place or what results 
emerged. Police made no efforts to ensure that hospitals treating gunshot victims 
systematically preserved bullets, which would have allowed for ballistics examination on a 
wide scale. Most victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that police and hospital 
personnel never explained to them the benefits of guarding bullets that were removed 
from their bodies, or from the bodies of their family members.272 Some police officers, for 
instance in Litein, collected bullets themselves from bodies during post-mortem 
examinations, but they were never used in investigations to determine responsibility for 
the shootings.273 Those officers should be made to account for the bullets’ whereabouts.  
 
Failure to Conduct Internal Investigations  
Due to public pressure following the televised shootings of George William Onyango and 
Isaiah Chacha in Kisumu, police established a committee to carry out an inquiry into 
excessive use of force by police during the post-election violence.  
 
Police spokesperson Kiraithe told Human Rights Watch in February 2008 that police had 
opened investigations into the conduct of 142 officers.274 But if this was the case, few were 
charged. Human Rights Watch found no evidence of election violence-related court cases 
against police, with the exception of Kirui. By October 2008, according to the Waki report, 
“apart from the ubiquitous inquest files, no internal investigations into the conduct of 
police officers were being undertaken or contemplated.”275 
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Some semblance of an internal investigation took place in Kisumu. According to the former 
head of the Western Kenya Law Society (WKLS), “Senior police officers came to investigate. 
WKLS met with them, but we never saw them again and just got stonewalling from the 
[Provincial Criminal Investigations Officer] when we asked about their findings. It was not a 
serious investigation; it was a reaction to public outrage. I don’t think any report was 
written.”276  
 
Other lawyers in Kisumu, who represented dozens of victims of police shootings, 
expressed surprise that they were never contacted by the police, given that they could 
have availed witnesses to provide testimony regarding police behavior. As one lawyer in 
Kisumu put it, “I saw absolutely no activity from the committee.”277 
 
Beyond Kisumu, most of the police officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch were 
themselves unaware of any internal investigation. A high-ranking police official who had 
worked in Western Province during the violence told Human Rights Watch, “I don’t know 
whether that inquiry ever happened. In Western, no one came around to interview police 
about who used excessive force.”278 Police shot dead at least 74 people in Western 
province.279 
 
Reasons for Lack of Accountability for Police Abuses 
The glaring absence of investigations into police shootings is not surprising. Until the 
passage of a new law in November 2011, which has not yet been implemented, Kenya had 
no measures in place to ensure police oversight, nor provisions to permit civilian 
prosecutors to conduct their own investigations into crimes attributed to police officers.  
 
In the absence of an oversight mechanism, police accountability has always been elusive 
in Kenya. As one lawyer told Human Rights Watch regarding the post-election violence, 
“The question is whether the police can be left to investigate themselves.”280 The answer 
appears fairly clear. Another lawyer, working on a police torture case unrelated to the post-
election violence, lamented: “The police are investigated by police, they are prosecuted by 
police … so it is very unlikely that it will result in a conviction.”281 
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Interviewed by Human Right Watch, the police found numerous justifications for the lack of 
accountability. One Kisumu police official said that a serious internal inquiry into police 
conduct during the elections “wouldn’t help the morale of the force.”282 Another police 
officer claimed that where no complaint was filed by a victim, police had no obligation to 
conduct investigations, even in the face of indisputable evidence that civilians were being 
shot by the police in large numbers: 
 
Why should I investigate myself if the family comes and takes the body 
from the mortuary but doesn’t complain? … If there is no complaint, we look 
at it as a closed case. We know we can investigate, but if no one is 
knocking on the door, we won’t open it. The police thought they were right 
[in shooting protestors].283  
 
This officer recognized that an oversight mechanism would be a positive step forward in 
countering police impunity. 
 
The failure to investigate police shootings also derives from the fact that particular officers 
suspected of unlawful use of force were sometimes highly influential. Human Rights Watch 
received several reports that the then-provincial police officer of Coast Province, King’ori 
Mwangi, personally shot at least two men in Mombasa, killing one. A witness saw Mwangi 
fire on a pickup truck that was carrying a group of youths. According to the witness,  
 
We heard someone saying, “Shoot, shoot.” He was very close and I heard 
him say it. It was calm because at the junction there were armed police. The 
junior police shot in the air. The senior officer [King’ori] shot at the pickup. 
King’ori took a few steps towards the direction of the vehicle. When [a 
youth in the pickup truck] turned to see King’ori he was shot in the head…. 
Before the shootout I had seen King’ori before, more than twice.284  
 
The victim was 25 year old Muzamil Abubakar Kato. In the same incident, another man was 
shot in the hand—also by Mwangi, according to a witness—and lost his thumb.285 
 
Kato’s family filed a complaint at Changamwe police station in January 2008.286 However, 
when NGOs later attempted to trace the complaint in order to assist the victims in seeking 
                                                          
282 Human Rights Watch interview with a senior police official, Kisumu, May 12, 2011. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Human Rights Watch interview, Mombasa, May 24, 2011.  
285 Human Rights Watch interviews, Mombasa, May 24, 2011.  
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justice, they were told either that the police Occurrence Book could not be located or that 
there was no record of the case in the Occurrence Book.287 Criminal Investigation 
Department officers came to Mombasa in July 2008 to investigate the case and called in 
witnesses for questioning.288 However, no arrests followed the investigations.  
 
Representatives of a Kenyan NGO went to the provincial police headquarters in September 
2010 and attempted to file a complaint on behalf of the victims, but they were told by a 
police official that he could not record a statement against a fellow officer of the same or 
higher rank.289  
 
NGOs that attempted to investigate this case were told by a Kenyan police official that 
Mwangi was “kingmaker” within the police force, and that the police official could 
therefore provide no information regarding the status of the complaint filed against him.290 
Mwangi was appointed deputy director of police reforms within the Kenya Police in 2010, 
over the objections of three Kenyan human rights organizations that cited his role in the 
Mombasa shootings.291  
 
Other officers cited by victims and witnesses were mid-level commanders who may wield 
significant influence within the force. Mid-level commanders named in interviews with 
Human Rights Watch who should be investigated include those who were in the following 
posts of Officer Commanding Station during the election violence, among others: the OCS 
of Kericho,292 the OCS of Langas,293 and the OCS of Sotik.294  
 
Civil Cases for Police Shootings: Failure to Pay Compensation  
In light of the authorities’ failure to bring criminal charges against the police, many 
surviving victims decided to pursue civil charges. Courts in both Nairobi and Kisumu, 
confronted with overwhelming evidence that police were responsible for unjustified use of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
286 Human Rights Watch interviews, Mombasa, May 24, 2011. 
287 Human Rights Watch interviews, Mombasa and Nairobi, May 24 and May 27, 2011.  
288 Human Rights Watch interviews, Nairobi and Mombasa, May 23 and May 24, 2011. 
289 Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, May 23, 2011.  
290 Human Rights Watch interview with an NGO representative, Nairobi, May 6, 2011.  
291 ICJ-Kenya, Kenyans for Justice and Development (KEJUDE), and Genesis for Human Rights Commission Mombasa (GHRC), 
“We condemn the culture of impunity where seniority grants immunity,” Press Statement, September 25, 2011, on file with 
Human Rights Watch.  
292 Human Rights Watch interview with a Kericho resident, August 22, 2011. 
293 Human Rights Watch interviews, Eldoret, May 2011.  
294 Human Rights Watch interview with a victim’s family member, Sotik, August 23, 2011. 
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force, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in at least 19 such cases, resulting in material awards. 
But the government has refused to pay up. 
 
When the government is ordered to pay compensation in a civil case, the lawyer for the 
complainant draws up a “certificate of order” and submits it to the attorney general’s 
office. The attorney general should, in turn, advise the office of the president of the 
obligation to pay compensation. But Section 21 of the Government Proceedings Act 
suggests courts can take no further action to enforce judgments against the government.295 
 
The failure to pay reflects a blatant refusal to provide justice to post-election violence 
victims and demonstrates the extent of impunity in Kenya. As one lawyer put it, “Once you 
get the judgment, there’s not much else you can do.”296 Another lawyer, working with 
clients in Kibera who were shot by the police, agreed: “The government always has 
impunity when it comes to compensation…. [In] enforcing a judgment against the 
government, most of the time you run into walls.”297 One lawyer has written to the Chief 
Justice to file a constitutional challenge to Section 21, noting that a similar law was ruled 
unconstitutional in South Africa.298 
 
A case in point is that of Peter Omari Ogenche, shot in the Kibera settlement in Nairobi. 
Police from Kilimani Police Station shot Ogenche on December 29, 2007, as he returned to 
his house from a public toilet. The bullet lodged in Ogenche’s spine. He is now a 
paraplegic.299  
 
With legal assistance, Ogenche sued the attorney general’s office. The High Court of Kenya 
in Nairobi found the government liable for the near-fatal shooting. Its 2010 judgment 
called the shooting “unprovoked, reckless, and an act of impunity on the part of the police 
officers.” It noted that Ogenche, 27 years old at the time of the shooting, “has a permanent 
residual disability at 100% according to the Workman’s Compensation Act.” The judgment 
observed that there was no dispute over the fact that police shot Ogenche. An occasional 
                                                          
295 Government Proceedings Act, Chapter 40 of the Laws of Kenya, section 21(4), reads that “no execution or attachment or 
process in the nature thereof shall be issued out of any court for enforcing payment by the Government of any money or costs, 
and no person shall be individually liable under any order for the payment by the Government or any Government department, 
or any officer of the Government as such, of any money or costs.” Some victims and lawyers are challenging this section in 
court.  
296 Human Rights Watch interview with advocate Joseph Musomba, Kisumu, May 10, 2011.  
297 Human Rights Watch interview with attorneys at the Kibera Centre for Legal Aid and Human Rights, Nairobi, May 19, 2011. 
298 Human Rights Watch interview with advocate Joseph Musomba, Kisumu, October 31, 2011. See Nyathi v. Member of the 
Executive Council for the Department of Health Gauteng and Another (CCT 19/07) [2008] ZACC 8, Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2008/8.pdf (accessed November 24, 2011).  
299 Human Rights Watch interview with Peter Omari Ogenche, Kibera, May 22, 2011. 
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laborer who washed cars for a living, Ogenche recognized the vehicle from which he was 
fired on; he had washed it on several occasions. His father and several friends witnessed 
the immediate aftermath of the shooting and saw the police, their guns, and Ogenche’s 
body lying nearby on the ground. A police officer who served as the only defense witness 
did not contest that police from Kilimani Police Station shot Ogenche. He could not provide 
evidence that police officials had undertaken investigations to determine which officers 
were responsible for the shooting. The court awarded Ogenche 5.4 million Kenyan shillings 
(US$60,000) in damages.300 But at this writing, Ogenche has not yet been paid. He 
continues to suffer pain and is unable to afford basic medication.  
 
In Kisumu, victims faced similar situations. Nicholas Odhiambo was near Kisumu on 
December 31, 2007, when he saw a police car that he said was marked “999,” normally 
used as an ambulance. Police alighted and began shooting; and a bullet grazed 
Odhiambo’s head. He told Human Rights Watch, “I went to court. I was told that the 
judgment arrived, and that the court ordered a 160,000 Kenyan shillings payment 
[US$1,778], last year. But up to now, the government hasn’t paid that money.”301 
 
One Kisumu lawyer told Human Rights Watch he alone handled 19 election-related cases in 
which the government had failed to pay court-ordered compensation. The total amount 
owed by the Kenyan government to victims he represented, as of August 2011, stood at 
over 5 million Kenyan shillings (US$55,556).302  
                                                          
300 Judgment, dated June 10, 2010, in High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Case No. 196 of 2008; copy on file with Human 
Rights Watch.  
301 Human Rights Watch interview with Nicholas Odhiambo, Kisumu, May 12, 2011.  
302 Communication from Joseph Musomba to Human Rights Watch, August 25, 2011.  
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VI. Status of Reforms, Steps Required, and  
the Case for a Special Mechanism 
 
If there’s not a special tribunal, I don’t think there will ever be any justice. 
—Lawyer in Kisumu 
 
International law imposes upon nations the responsibility to prosecute international 
crimes and other serious violations of human rights law that amount to criminal acts.303 
Major changes are needed to Kenya’s justice system in order for Kenya to effectively meet 
this obligation to its citizens. 
 
Kenya has initiated a series of reforms which, if properly implemented, may address some 
shortcomings found in the approach to justice for post-election violence over the past four 
years. Some reforms are a result of commitments made as part of Kenya’s National Accord 
and Reconciliation Act, signed in February 2008 to stop the violence, while others are 
related to Kenya’s new constitution, voted by referendum in August 2010.  
 
But institutional changes alone will not deliver reform. A revolution in political attitudes at 
the highest levels in the Kenyan government is required. 
 
A lawyer who had won acquittals for his clients in a number of post-election violence cases, 
asked whether the reforms underway would allow for successful prosecution of post-
election violence in the Kenyan courts in the near future, responded skeptically: 
 
It is nonsense.… The status quo remains. The courts are corrupt. The courts 
are overburdened. Judicial personnel is lacking; we have one-third of what’s 
required.… The registries are congested, and the registrars are not trained.  
 
The police situation is even worse. One police officer is serving 1,000 
people. Both the numbers and the training are issues. In many cases they 
don’t even know the ingredients of an offense. The moment that someone 
has given a statement, it [the investigation of a case] ends there.304 
 
                                                          
303 See Human Rights Watch, Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace, July 2009, 
http://www.hrw.org/node/84264, pp. 10-14.  
304 Human Rights Watch interview with a lawyer, Nakuru, April 28, 2011.  
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Police Reforms 
Key to improving transparency and accountability in the police is police vetting and the 
removal of obstructive personnel. Oversight mechanisms, including mechanisms that 
make it easier for civilians to file complaints about police conduct, are also needed. Some 
of these reforms are underway. The former police commissioner was transferred to the 
Postal Service in September 2009. In May 2009 the government established a National 
Task Force on Police Reform.305 Its November 2009 report was followed by the creation in 
January 2010 of a Police Reforms Implementation Committee, mandated to translate the 
task force’s key recommendations into law and policy.  
 
In August 2011 parliament passed the National Police Service bill. The bill replaces the 
Police Commissioner with an Inspector General, who will oversee both the Kenya Police 
and the Administration Police, previously separate bodies. The bill also addresses police 
conduct, including a provision that regulates the use of force.306 
 
The passage of the National Police Service bill was followed in September with a second 
bill to create a National Police Service Commission. The commission will have a civilian 
board, including two retired senior officers, and will make appointments, promotions, 
transfers, and dismissals from the police force. The commission will be empowered to 
receive complaints from the public and to recommend remedies or to refer such 
complaints to the proposed Independent Policing Oversight Authority, the Kenya National 
Human Rights and Equality Commission, the Director of Public Prosecutions, or the Ethics 
and Anti-Corruption Commission.307 A bill to establish an Independent Policing Oversight 
Authority, as recommended by the task force, was passed in November 2011. 
 
The new laws will also create a Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), to replace the 
Criminal Investigation Department. The DCI will have its own dedicated staff, a shift from 
past policy under which any police officer, including those with low rank and little formal 
                                                          
305 The task force, composed of 18 civilians, including foreign experts, issued 200 recommendations, including for the 
establishment of an Independent Policing Oversight Authority, empowered to investigate allegations of any unlawful 
behavior by a member of the police or by a police body. United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 
Seventeenth session, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns,” 
April 26, 2011, A/HRC/17/28/Add.4, p. 9.  
306 National Police Service Commission Bill, Parliament of Kenya, 2010, art. 41. The law sets forth that “a Police officer may 
use force and firearms, if and to such extent only as is necessary.” 
307 “Civilian team to promote or dismiss police officers,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), June 25, 2011, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Civilian+team+to+promote+or+dismiss+police+officers+/-/1056/1189004/-/uvscyoz/-/ 
(accessed June 27, 2011).  
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education, could investigate complaints.308 If its staff is provided sufficient training and 
resources, the quality of investigations may improve. 
 
Police vetting is also planned. Vetting of senior officers was initiated in May 2011 with the 
goal of evaluating professionalism, integrity, track record, and psychological fitness in 
order to inform decisions on promotion, demotion, redeployment, or dismissal of police 
officers.309 The process was suspended after vivid objections from civil society that 
stakeholders in the police reform process were not consulted and that the vetting was 
being carried out by the police themselves. Questioning the constitutionality of the 
process, the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights argued that “Police cannot 
possibly vet themselves and achieve desirable results.” The KNCHR encouraged a 
transparent process, as seen in the nomination of judicial personnel, discussed below.310 
Police vetting is to resume once the National Police Service Commission is in place.311 
 
The police reforms, if fully implemented, may contribute to accountability for the 2007-
2008 post-election violence in several ways. First, victims of police violence who were 
afraid to bring their complaints before the police—as well as those who did file complaints, 
but received no response—will be able to file complaints before a new, independent, 
civilian board. Second, the vetting process should be conducted in a manner that allows 
for civilian input, with space for citizens to bring forward complaints concerning the 
behavior of individual officers during the election violence period.  
 
Worryingly, the police seem at times unwilling to recognize the need for reform, and closed 
to external recommendations. A piece published on the Kenya Police website in June 2011 
made the claim, apparently in response to recommendations from the Special Rapporteur 
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, that “the international community 
cannot add sustainable value to any country’s law enforcement unless that country is 
willing to become a colony.”312 Such views from the police are of great concern—especially 
given that the police regularly request training and material support from the international 
community—and threaten to undermine the success of reforms. 
                                                          
308 National Police Service Commission Bill, 2010, arts. 25-29. 
309 Angira Zaddock, ”Saitoti allays fears on police vetting,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), June 20, 2011, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1178652/-/7sr7vj/-/index.html (accessed June 27, 2011) 
310 KNCHR, “KNCHR Statement on Ongoing Police Vetting,” June 10, 2011, on record with Human Rights Watch.  
311 Bernard Momanyi, “Anxiety over Police Vetting,” The Standard (Nairobi), September 7, 2011, 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000042298&cid=658&story=Anxiety%20over%20police%20vetting 
(accessed September 14, 2011).  
312 “A View on Hooliganism,” Kenya Police, “News,” June 21, 2011, http://www.kenyapolice.go.ke/News144.asp (accessed 
June 21, 2011). The author is not identified. 
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Judicial Reforms 
Kenya has made notable progress in judicial reform. The 2010 constitution called for the 
establishment of a Judicial Service Commission, composed of the attorney general, three 
judges, two advocates, and one person named by the Public Service Commission.313 The 
purpose of the Judicial Service Commission is to “ensure and enhance the independence 
and accountability of the judiciary and the efficient, effective and transparent 
administration of justice,” including through nominating and vetting judges. In May 2011, 
following a historically transparent process in which candidates were interviewed on live 
television, the Judicial Service Commission nominated a new chief justice, Dr. Willy 
Mutunga, and deputy chief justice, Nancy Baraza. Both are widely recognized as reformers 
whose track records suggest a willingness to tackle corruption, political influence, and 
inertia in the judiciary head-on.314 
 
A recommended reform was that the director of public prosecutions (DPP) be made 
independent of the attorney general. Formerly, the attorney general, a political appointee, 
had little incentive to pursue cases that could threaten political interests. Under the new 
constitution, the DPP is independent, with the power to direct the inspector general of the 
National Police Service to carry out investigations.315 Keriako Tobiko, who has been DPP 
since 2002, was appointed in 2011 for a new eight year term. However, in violation of the 
constitution, Kibaki and Odinga set up a closed nomination panel, with Tobiko emerging 
as the only candidate; this sharp contrast with the transparency around other judicial 
nominations was criticized from a number of quarters, including by the Justice Minister.316 
The Constitution Implementation Oversight Committee approved the nomination, but 
recommended that various allegations of wrongdoing be investigated. Such investigations 
have not yet been initiated.317 
 
Further reforms underway include the establishment of a Supreme Court and the vetting of 
all Kenyan judges.  
 
Other urgent reforms have not yet been initiated. Most important is the recruitment of 
civilian prosecutors. The DPP has recognized the inadequacy of police prosecutors, and 
                                                          
313 Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010, art. 171.  
314 Human Rights Watch interviews with Kenyan civil society organizations, Nairobi, May 2011. 
315 Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010, art. 157(4).  
316 Martin Mutua, “Nominees: Tobiko's approval divides MPs,” The Standard (Nairobi), June 13, 2011, 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000037039&cid=4 (accessed August 8, 2011).  
317 “The trouble with Tobiko,” Africa Confidential, vol. 52, no. 13, pp. 4-5. 
 “TURNING PEBBLES”      74 
has outlined plans to train and hire more professional civilian prosecutors.318 However, 
these plans were not included in the government budget for 2011-2012, calling into 
question Kenya’s political will to fully professionalize its prosecutorial service. If not 
infused with resources, the State Law Office may also suffer desertions following a call 
from the judiciary in September 2011 for the recruitment of 160 new magistrates; several 
state counsel told Human Rights Watch they were vying for the more highly-paid positions 
in the magistracy.319 
 
The Case for a Special Mechanism320 
The Kenyan police and judicial system have shown themselves to be unprepared or 
unwilling to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate serious election-related crimes. 
Despite the reforms, it will take at least several years to address the multiple institutional 
weaknesses that have hindered successful prosecutions.  
 
To effectively widen accountability, it will be necessary to establish special mechanisms 
within the Kenyan judicial system to address cases of post-election violence, using the 
International Crimes Act and other Kenyan laws. These special mechanisms—including a 
dedicated bench or division within the High Court, a special prosecutor or dedicated units 
within the Directorate of Public Prosecutions, a dedicated unit within the Directorate of 
Criminal Investigations, and a dedicated cell within the Witness Protection Agency—should 
feature carefully vetted and recruited Kenyan and international personnel.321 
 
For police crimes, including the hundreds of shootings and dozens of rapes by police, a 
unit within the special investigative team should be specifically empowered to investigate 
such crimes. 
 
Efforts are needed to enhance the expertise among police, prosecutors, and judges 
required to successfully prosecute international crimes, including substantive knowledge 
of the Rome Statute, the different modes of liability, and relevant defenses. Without this 
                                                          
318 Tobiko told participants at a training in June 2011, “Ninety percent of prosecution works in this country in the lower court 
is handled by police prosecutors. They do not have the requisite legal training to handle complex cases.” Tobiko further 
stated that Kenya currently has only 83 civilian prosecutors and 108 support staff, with a need of 1000 professionals in each 
category. Judie Kaberia, “Police prosecutions soon obsolete,” Capital FM (Kenya), June 27, 2011, 
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/Kenyanews/Police-prosecutions-soon-obsolete-13376.html (accessed June 29, 2011). 
319 Human Rights Watch interviews, Rift Valley Province, September 2011. 
320 For the sake of simplicity, we adopt the widely-used term “special mechanism” in this report, although what may be 
required to ensure accountability is the establishment of several separate but interlinked “special mechanisms.” 
321 Prosecutions could be led by the Director of Public Prosecutions, who could appoint a team of Kenyan and international 
staff; alternatively, Parliament could establish a Special Prosecutor position. 
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expertise the Kenyan judicial system will be left without an important tool for capturing all 
modes of criminal conduct witnessed during the post-election violence and bringing to 
account those responsible at the top. 
 
The police prosecutorial system remains a serious obstacle to justice. In the absence of a 
special mechanism, benefiting from the presence of international prosecutors to 
complement the skills of some of Kenya’s best state counsel, it is difficult to envision how 
each individual jurisdiction in Kenya will muster the human resources required to 
successfully prosecute election violence cases. Haphazard prosecutions on a jurisdiction-
to-jurisdiction bases, in Kenya’s 17 High Court stations and sub-registries of the High Court 
and its 105 magistrates’ courts, based on investigations by at least 85 police divisions 
throughout the country, are unlikely to yield knowledge about the organization of crimes.  
 
Indeed, once established, the first task of the special prosecutor or prosecutorial team 
should be to devise a strategy to prioritize cases, to ensure investigations and 
prosecutions encompass links between the planning of crimes at high levels and the 
carrying out of crimes locally, and to determine which cases are to be heard through these 
specially established mechanisms and which cases, if any, can proceed through the 
ordinary courts. The investigation and prosecution of post-election violence cases could be 
centralized. The International Center for Transitional Justice has recommended strategic 
litigation in response to post-election violence cases, “combin[ing] cases that together 
expose the organizational systems and leaders responsible for planning, authorizing and 
executing atrocities.”322  
 
There are additional reasons why prosecution of post-election violence requires an 
institution with a national strategy. Evidence collected by the Waki Commission and by 
human rights organizations suggests that in a number of cases, crimes may have been 
planned in one jurisdiction and perpetrated in another, or that perpetrators may have 
traveled from one jurisdiction to another in order to commit crimes. Further, witnesses and 
victims have traveled, especially those who became internally displaced during the 
                                                          
322 International Center for Transitional Justice, “Creating a Feasible Domestic Mechanism for Justice and Accountability for 
Post-Election Crimes in Kenya,” March 2011, p. 8. ICTJ warns against the risks of illuminating individual low-level crimes 
without a centralized mechanism to prosecute crimes that may have been organized at a high level. Citing the example of 
Colombia, ICTJ writes, “Even though some 40,000 [cases] have been completed… there has been no use of aggregate data 
and system analysis. The criminal justice system’s interventions have therefore been fragmented. Despite criminal 
responsibility in related to many different crimes being established, the structures of the different criminal apparatus 
responsible for crimes stay uncovered,” p. 9.  
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violence.323 No system is currently in place to facilitate police and prosecutorial outreach 
to witnesses and victims who have left their jurisdictions.  
 
One parliamentarian has recently called for a Special Tribunal Division within the High 
Court, but has suggested the division could be entirely staffed by Kenyans.324 While an all-
Kenyan special mechanism would be preferable to no such mechanism at all, previous 
Kenyan truth seeking and quasi-judicial bodies, including the Akiwumi Commission, the 
Waki Commission, and the TJRC, have included international personnel out of the 
recognition that their inclusion provided some guarantee of political neutrality. The 
Akiwumi Commission, for instance, was headed by a Nigerian judge.  
 
An international presence would also strengthen the capacity of the mechanism. 
International personnel could bring knowledge of the prosecution of international crimes 
in other jurisdictions. In addition to foreign judges, foreign prosecutors and investigators 
would help make up for the current lack of capacity found within the Kenyan police. The 
same would likely be true for foreign witness protection experts, given that Kenya’s 
Witness Protection Agency is not yet operational. Defendants before the special bench or 
division charged with international crimes should also have access to both Kenyan and 
foreign counsel. A lawyer in Eldoret suggested, “It will be necessary to have international 
personnel in the special tribunal, for purposes of experience—like in the Waki Commission. 
And the international personnel there had no local political interest.”325  
 
Kenyan civil society organizations have recently refocused their efforts on advocating for 
the establishment of a special mechanism. When a new bill for a special mechanism next 
comes up for consideration—one that has the backing of civil society organizations and 
victims’ groups—Kenyan lawmakers should recall President Kibaki’s December 15, 2010, 
promise that justice would be delivered through a local tribunal and should pass the bill 
without delay. Kenya’s international partners will also have an important role to play, first, 
in maintaining pressure on the Kenyan government to make good on Kibaki’s promise, and, 
second, once these special mechanisms are created, to support their rapid 
operationalization. 
 
Establishing such special mechanisms may take time. In the meantime, the Kenyan police 
should publicly inform all victims of violence that they can still come forward to file 
complaints, or—as in the many cases of victims who filed complaints in 2008 and never 
                                                          
323 Human Rights Watch interview with a lawyer, Eldoret, May 23, 2011. 
324 Human Rights Watch interview with member of Parliament Gitobu Imanyara, Nairobi, September 9, 2011. 
325 Human Rights Watch interview with a lawyer, Eldoret, May 27, 2011.  
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heard from the police again—check the status of complaints filed and provide 
complementary evidence.  
 
Non-Judicial Accountability 
Judicial accountability for post-election violence is essential and non-negotiable; not only 
is it required by international law, but Kenyan citizens believe prosecutions are necessary 
in order to move forward and prevent future violence. Judicial accountability can and 
should be complemented by other, non-judicial measures to ensure accountability, and 
the government should step up efforts to ensure the successful implementation of such 
measures, while bearing in mind that they cannot serve as a substitute for prosecutions.  
 
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has argued that “the 
right to the truth about gross human rights violations and serious violations of human 
rights law is an inalienable and autonomous right.”326 
 
In November 2008 President Kibaki signed into law a bill establishing a Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission. The TJRC’s mandate includes investigating human rights 
violations committed between 1963 and February 28, 2008, when the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act was signed. Kenyan human rights organizations were initially deeply 
critical of the law establishing the TJRC; it provided vaguely-defined “conditional 
amnesties” for some human rights abuses, and that it did not clearly oblige the attorney 
general to prosecute crimes on the basis of its recommendations. Others worried that the 
two year time period provided to the TJRC to operate was insufficient given its broad 
mandate: to address gross human rights abuses committed throughout Kenya between 
1962 and 2008.327  
 
In violation of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act (2008), the government released 
only a small portion of the budget that had been allocated to the commission, 
demonstrating a lack of political will to ensure its effective functioning. A TJRC official told 
Human Rights Watch, “Politicians wanted to weaken the TJRC so that it can’t produce a 
report. Most politicians don’t want this process, because it’s catching up with them.… The 
                                                          
326 OHCHR, “Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Study on the Right to the Truth,” E/CN.4/2006/91, February 8, 2006, 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/106/56/PDF/G0610656.pdf?OpenElement (accessed November 27, 
2011).  
327 Ndung’u Wainaina, “The inadequacies of truth and justice commission law,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), February 6, 2009, 
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Treasury says they don’t have enough money. So you have to work at half your capacity.”328 
Eventually the government released additional funds to the TJRC in early 2011, though only 
half of what the TJRC had requested, allowing it to begin public hearings in April 2011.329 
 
As of this writing, the TJRC is carrying out ongoing public hearings, including in areas 
heavily affected by the post-election violence. It intends to conclude public hearings 
through March 2012, and to release its report by the end of May. Several civil society 
organizations warmed to the TJRC after observing its role as a platform for victims to openly 
denounce perpetrators. 
 
The TJRC is mandated, in its final report, to recommend prosecutions for offences that 
qualify as gross human rights violations and reparations for victims.330 The law 
establishing the commission requires the government to implement its 
recommendations.331 It is too early to tell whether the government will comply with this 
requirement. The TJRC can contribute to Kenya’s truth-seeking and healing process, but it 
is no substitute for judicial accountability. 
 
Reparations and Compensation 
United Nations guidelines recommend that states “provide effective remedies to victims 
[of gross violations of human rights], including reparation.”332 There is no comprehensive 
reparations policy for victims of human rights violations in Kenya.333 The TJRC can 
recommend reparations to individual victims or to victim groups, and the government is 
obligated to abide by its recommendations. However, victims have yet to benefit from any 
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333 Reparations are based on the principle that following a serious human rights violation, war crime, or crime against 
humanity, states should ensure that measures be taken to repair the harm done to victims, including through restitution, 
which is meant to “restore the victim to the original situation” before the violation was committed; compensation “for any 
economically assessable damage” that is “proportional to the gravity of the violation”; and rehabilitation, which “should 
include medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services.” See Simon Robins, “‘To Live as Other Kenyans 
Do’: A Study of the Reparative Demands of Kenyan Victims of Human Rights Violations,” ICTJ, July 2011, 
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Kenya-Reparations-Demands-2011-English.pdf (accessed November 27, 2011), p. 8. 
The UN guidelines suggest that “States should endeavour to establish national programmes for reparation and other 
assistance to victims in the event that the parties liable for the harm suffered are unable or unwilling to meet their 
obligations.” “Basic Principles and Guidelines,” art. 16.  
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such reparations. Civil society organizations have called for a more comprehensive 
national reparations policy, which the TJRC may recommend in its final report, but which 
should be undertaken even in the absence of such a recommendation.334 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the violence, the government distributed small 
compensation packages to many victims, ranging from 10,000 to 25,000 Kenyan shillings 
(approximately US$115 to US$280).335 However, other victims slipped between the cracks 
and did not receive even that small sum. The non-uniformity of the compensation, which 
both victims themselves and the organizations working with them see as favoring Kikuyu 
victims, has created confusion and tension.336  
 
The government has provided no specific reparations in terms of medical assistance.337 
Hundreds if not thousands of victims continue to suffer from injuries incurred during post-
election violence, and have had no forum to request medical reparations from the 
government. In Litein, Human Rights Watch interviewed Leonard Koech, a 26-year-old who 
was shot in the head by police during riots on February 5, 2008. The bullet remains lodged 
in Koech’s skull, impairing his mental functions. Koech told Human Rights Watch: 
 
I was at work as a shoe shiner. That morning, it was calm. But then violence 
started, and I was taking my properties to safety. Immediately I was shot by 
an [administration police] officer. I collapsed and was taken to Litein 
hospital. I was shot in the temple. My eye came out of its socket. It was put 
back at the hospital.  
 
The bullet is in the top left of my head. Doctors told me “If the bullet is 
removed, you will die.” The veins are itching at times. At times my eye 
stands still and it doesn’t move. I have pain in my head. I can’t see out of 
my left eye—I’m totally blind in that eye. Medication is expensive and I can’t 
afford it, although the hospital told me to take medication. Also I have 
memory loss—I can be told something today in the evening, but the next 
                                                          
334 Views expressed by civil society organizations at a conference attended by Human Rights Watch, Naivasha, August 25-26, 
2011; ICTJ, “To Live as Other Kenyans Do,” July 2011, pp. 57-60. 
335 According to the Ministry of State for Special Programmes, 25,000 Kenyan shillings were paid to those whose houses had 
been burned or destroyed, while 10,000 Kenyan shillings were given to those whose homes were looted, in order to replace 
basic household effect. “Progress Report on IDP Resettlement,” on file with Human Rights Watch. But Human Rights Watch 
also found that some other victims received compensation, including some victims of police shootings in Kisumu.  
336 Human Rights Watch interview with IDP Network chairperson Patrick Githinji, Nakuru, October 24, 2011.  
337 “Basic Principles and Guidelines,” art. 21.  
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day I forget. I still work as a shoe shiner. But sometimes I come to work and 
I forget that I’m at work. 
 
I received no compensation. I never recorded any statement with the police. 
After I was discharged, I was afraid to go to the police station, so I couldn’t 
record a complaint.  
 
I want assistance for medication and check-ups. I want all those 
perpetrators to be prosecuted so that we can avoid this happening again.338 
 
Koech’s case points to the need for an urgent reparations program, as recommended by 
the ICTJ.339 But his testimony also demonstrates that reparations alone would not be 
enough. The victims of the post-election violence continue to call for justice.  
                                                          
338 Human Rights Watch interview with Leonard Koech, Litein, August 23, 2011.  
339 ICTJ, “To Live as Other Kenyans Do,” July 2011, p. 59. 
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Appendix I: Case Studies by Human Rights Watch  
by Jurisdiction 
 
This appendix documents the 76 cases that Human Rights Watch researched in 11 
jurisdictions throughout Kenya. Human Rights Watch was unable to consult the several 
thousand post-election violence files listed in the March 2011 Department of Public 
Prosecutions report. Instead, we focused on some of the most serious crimes in Kenya’s 
Criminal Code: murder, robbery with violence, rape, attempted rape, defilement, and 
assault causing actual bodily harm. In some cases, wrong information on case numbers 
provided by the Department of Public Prosecutions report or other sources led us to 
consult case files for minor charges; when that occurred, we included those cases in our 
study as well. For a number of cases on the Department of Public Prosecutions list, upon 
consultation of the file, there was no evidence that the crime was related to the post-
election violence; that is indicated in this chart. In a few cases on this list, Human Rights 
Watch was unable to physically consult the case file, but received detailed information 
from police, judicial officials, or other sources. 
 
This list includes cases heard at both High Courts (case numbers prefaced with “HCCR”) 
and Chief’s Magistrate’s Courts (case numbers ordinarily prefaced with “CR”, omitted here).  
 
The information in this appendix is on the public record. However, in order to protect 
victims’ privacy, we only include the names of victims who lost their lives in the violence. 
Further details on most cases, including the police case number, the Occurrence Book (OB) 
number, the location of the incident, and the names of defense lawyers, prosecutors, and 
judges or magistrates who handled the cases, are on file with Human Rights Watch. 
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Bungoma (One court case researched) 












Khamala convicted in 2010, sentenced to seven years, 
reduced to three years on appeal; Wangala and 
Manyonge sentenced to probation; Kuloba acquitted.  
Case number wrongly listed in the Department of 
Public Prosecutions report as 5/08. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
 
Butere (Two court cases researched) 
Case Number Accused Charge Outcome/Comments 




charge of indecent act 
Acquitted of rape; convicted of indecent act,
sentenced to 1 year. 
Sentenced wrongly listed as 10 years in the 
Department of Public Prosecutions report. 
Not related to PEV. 
21/08 Bonface Anyembe 
Kweyu 
Shopbreaking Convicted in April 2009; sentenced to three years.
Incident appears related to PEV. 
 
Eldoret (22 court cases researched) 
Case Number Accused Charge Outcome/Comments 
HCCR 15B/08 Abraham Karonei alias 
Kipketer Kemboi 
Chokoro, Robert 
Kimaiyo Tanui alias 




Acquitted on October 14, 2010. 
File indicated poor police investigations. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
Unknown 17 people  Murder of Father
Michael Kamau 
Withdrawn.
Suspects were arrested because they were 
manning a roadblock near where Kamau was 
killed. There was no evidence linking them to the 
murder and they were released. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
HCCR 5/08 (Appeal 
389/10 at Eldoret 
Appeals Court) 





Convicted; appeal in progress. 
Not related to PEV. 
387/08 Paul Kiptoo Barno, 
James Yutor Korir, 
and Isaiah Kipkorir 
Leting 
Robbery with violence 
(causing death of 
District Officer Benedict 
Omolo and Chief 
Inspector Elias Wafula) 
Acquitted.
File indicated poor police investigations and 
prosecution. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
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167/08 Isaac Ngetich 
Timpolo 
Robbery with violence Acquitted of robbery with violence; convicted of
simple robbery, sentenced to five years 
Incident appears related to PEV; opportunistic 
robbery carried out in context of chaos. 
5976/08 Julius Cheruiyot Kogo Gang rape Acquitted on July 13, 2009. 
Judge ruled that victim’s identification of accused 
was questionable. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
178/08 Sammy Navidali, 
Moses Mbakz, 
Kennedy Kipsoi 
Gang rape Convicted, sentenced to 10 years 
Human Rights Watch was unable to consult file but 
received details from police. Unclear whether 
incident is related to PEV. Accused are Luhya and 
Kalenjin; complainants are two Kalenjin teenage girls. 
414/08 Nicholas Oyamo Assault causing actual
bodily harm 
Withdrawn
Complainant withdrew charges. 
Not related to PEV; incident took place in 2006. 
460/08 Shaban Cheruiyot 
Ruto 
Assault Acquitted on March 6, 2009 
Police and court errors: Clinical officer did not 
appear in court to produce exhibit (no warrant 
issued by court); investigating officer also did not 
appear despite warrant. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
391/08 Stephen Maina Assault Convicted, sentenced to one year
Conflict between landlord and tenant, both 
apparently Kikuyu. 
Likely not related to PEV. 
457/08 Lichuma Melchizedek Assault Convicted, sentenced to pay 20,000 Kenyan 
shillings (roughly US$215) fine 
Dispute between former boyfriend and girlfriend 
over money 
Likely not related to PEV. 
52/08 Francis Fwamba 
Barasa 
Arson, stealing Withdrawn.
Investigating Officer, Police Constable.  Wambua, 
failed to appear in court. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
101/08 Erick Kipsoge Torgon, 
Stanley Torkiptoo 
Torgon, Philip Kiptunui 
Torgon, Bernard 
Wekesa Chebunga 
Arson Withdrawn in July 2009.  
Withdrawn at complainant’s request; no reason 
given. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
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537/08 Barnabas Tiony Arson Acquitted in September 2008. 
Prosecution did not bring any witnesses to court, 
including the complainant. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
6035/08 David Mwaura 
Karanja 
Sexual harassment Acquitted on September 2, 2009.
Complainant, an internally displaced person 
allegedly harassed by the accused at Eldoret 
Showground IDP camp, did not appear in court. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 




First accused acquitted; warrant in effect for
second accused. 
Prosecution failed to call any witnesses other than 
the complainant—including the Investigating Officer. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
383/08 Joseph Anzimbo Stealing Acquitted.
Judge acquitted accused because two prosecution 
witnesses gave different dates of the offense. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
484/08 Appollo Nyachon 
Otieno  
Stealing Acquitted on April 27, 2009. 
Police did not produce evidence to demonstrate 
that the metal doors found with the accused were 
same as those stolen. 
Incident appears related to PEV.  
237/08 David Korir and 
Josephat Kiptanuito 
Stealing Withdrawn.
Police file “could not be found” by police 
prosecutor. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
392/08 Joseph Mukuha 
Mwangi 
Stealing Withdrawn.
Complainant withdrew charges; reason unknown. 
Theft of sheep; accused and complainant both 
apparently Kikuyu; likely unrelated to PEV. 
33/08 Geoffrey Muloli, 
Fredrick Imoli 
Shitemi, Morris 
Okindi Shitemi, Jane 
Nafula, Florence Kage 
Housebreaking Withdrawn.
Withdrawn by complainant; reasons unknown. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
34/08 Juliet Kahindi  
Kayugira with others 
Housebreaking Withdrawn (due to death of the accused in
custody). 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
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Kakamega (Four court cases researched) 
Case Number Accused Charge Outcome/Comments 
223/08 Paul Shiali Ashirikwa Defilement of a
person with a mental 
disability 
Convicted.
Not related to PEV. 
42/08 Vincent Owiti 
Mbayachi 
Defilement Convicted, sentenced to 14 years. 
Not related to PEV. 
221/08 Mohammed Nyangala Incest (rape of his
daughter) 
Acquitted.
The Department of Public Prosecutions report 
erroneously lists this case as a conviction.  
Not related to PEV. 
17/08 Silas Lusiri Attempted defilement Acquitted.
Not related to PEV. 
 
Kericho (Eight court cases researched) 
Case Number Accused Charge Outcome/Comments 
HCCR 24/08 
(formerly Buret 




Kemboi and Kirkland 
Kipngeno Langat 
Murder of PC Peter
Githinji and APC 
David Odhiambo 
(both police officers) 
Convicted, sentenced to death; appeal in progress.
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
86/08 Francis Kipn’geno, 
Sammy Kosgei, Simon 
Ruto, Peter Biegon 
(charges later 
withdrawn against 





(causing death of 
Administration Police 
Commissioner 
Hassan Omar Dado) 
Acquitted, 1 April 2009; Sawe convicted of assault.
File indicates poor police investigations. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 





violence, gang rape 
Acquitted.
Judge ruled that victim’s identification of accused 
was questionable. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
87/08 Gideon Kibet Ruto Robbery with violence Withdrawn.
Reasons for withdrawal unclear; according to one 
lawyer, may have been “part of a political deal.” 






Robbery with violence Convicted in May 2009, sentenced to death; appeal
rejected. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
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95/08 Wesley Kipsang Korir Robbery with violence Withdrawn.
Prosecutor produced no witnesses in court, 
including complainant. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
280/08 Harrison Kimutai Soi Assault causing
actual bodily harm 
Case closed pending arrest.  
Accused jumped bail. 
Unclear from file whether incident was related to 
PEV. 
11/08  Samwel Nyangaresi Preparation to
commit a felony 
Case closed pending arrest.  
Accused jumped bail. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
 
Kitale (Five court cases researched)  
Case Number Accused Charge Outcome/Comments 





Withdrawn in December 2008. 
Complainants did not appear in court. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
248/08 David Ndiema 
Kiptarus, alias Kirui, 
and 8 others 
Robbery with violence Acquitted.
Evidence did not demonstrate that the two 
accused— a police officer and home guard present 
during a mob attack—were themselves involved in 
the attack. Judge ruled that the incident was 
wrongly charged as robbery with violence. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
814/08 Madan Arunga Defilement Convicted, sentenced to life imprisonment; appeal
pending. 
Human Rights Watch was unable to consult the file, 
which was in court when researchers visited Kitale.  
Unclear whether the incident was related to PEV. 
172/08 Augustine Cheruiyot 
Kemboi alias Siret, 
Michael Kemei 
Samoei alias Kamau, 
Willy Kipkoech Terer 
alias Mwalimu, 
Simon Kimeli Langat 
Arson (2 counts); 
breaking into building 
and committing a 
felony; entering a 
dwelling-house with 
intent to commit a 
felony; burglary 
Withdrawn.
Police file never received by police prosecutor. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
105/08 Michael Nyarkinyi, 
Francis Cheptai 
Simatwa 
Arson (9 counts) Withdrawn.
The prosecutor moved to consolidate nine cases of 
arson and then asked to withdraw the case. 
Incident appears related to PEV. 
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Molo (Four court cases researched)  
Case Number Accused Charge Outcome/Comments 
Inq. 4/08 Thomas Belsoi (not 
formally charged) 
Inquest into death of
Nahashon Mburu 
Pending before Molo Magistrate’s Court as an
inquest; no criminal charges filed. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
219/08 Dedan Rop and 
Charles Ngeno 
Arson, stealing Acquitted on September 14, 2009.
Prosecution witnesses contradicted their earlier 
statements and were treated as hostile witnesses. 
Unclear from file whether incident was related to 
PEV. 
102/08 Bernard Sabastian 
Nyaikara 
Stealing Convicted, sentenced to fine of 5,000 Kshs 
(approximately US$550) and 3 months in jail. 
Not related to PEV. 
213/08 Sammy Mbuthia, 
James Mzungu 
Office breaking and 
stealing 
“Dismissed” according to court file.
 Judge cited conflicting testimony by prosecution 
witnesses, as well as “police failure.”  
Unclear from file whether incident was related to 
PEV.  
 
Mombasa (Two court files researched)  
Case Number Accused Charge Outcome/Comments 
295/08 Alex Chita Ngoji Stealing Convicted, sentenced to four months community
work. 
Not related to PEV. 




According to court file, warrant for arrest of suspect
issued in August 2008; no further information in 
file. According to the Department of Public 
Prosecutions report, “case to be withdrawn for lack 
of evidence” as of March 2011. 
 
Nairobi (Two court files researched) 
Case Number Accused Charge Outcome/Comments 
HCCR 9/08 Edward Kirui, police 
constable 
Murder of George
William Onyango and 
Ismail Chacha 
Acquitted.
Organizations that followed the case attributed the 
acquittal to tampering with evidence. 
Clearly related to PEV. 
HCCR 57/08 James Omondi Odera 
& 3 others 
Murder of Melitus
Mugabe Were 
Pending before the court. 
Not related to PEV. 
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Naivasha (Four court files researched) 
Case Number Accused Charge Outcome/Comments 






Convicted of robbery with violence only, sentenced
to life imprisonment; acquitted for attempted rape. 
Incident clearly related to PEV.  
167/08 John Kiragu Wanjiru, 
David Ekai, Paul 
Maina Kamau, and 
Silas Korogoi 
Attempted rape Acquitted on April 13, 2010. 
Judge found that perpetrators attempted to unzip 
victim’s trousers, but found no evidence of 
attempted rape. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
204/08 Peter Kinywa Gichini Defilement Convicted, sentenced to community service.
Not related to PEV. 
19/08K Jonathan Moody 
William 
Attempted rape Acquitted on March 28, 2008  
Judge acquitted because after three adjournments, the 
police file not presented in court. 
Unclear whether incident was related to PEV due to 
lack of information in court file. 
77/08 Sospeter Ndungu 
Wanjiru 
Assault Convicted, sentenced to one year probation.
The Department of Public Prosecutions report 
erroneously lists this case as 19/08 and as a case of 
defilement committed by an army officer. The case 
number, the crime, and the accused are all inaccurate. 
19/08 was a housebreaking case. Tracing the case by 
the victim’s name, we found this was a case of simple 
assault committed by a civilian. 
Not related to PEV. 
167/08 John Kiragu Wanjiru, 
David Ekai, Paul 
Maina Kamau, and 
Silas Korogoi 
Attempted rape Acquitted on April 13, 2010. 
Judge found that perpetrators attempted to unzip 
victim’s trousers, but found no evidence of 
attempted rape. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
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Nakuru (13 court cases researched)  
Case Number Accused Charge Outcome




Julius Nyogio Rono 
Murder of Joseph 
Kimani Karugu, Mitati 




Wanjiru Mburu and 
Simon Gatimba Mburu. 
Acquitted.
Incident clearly related to PEV. 




Convicted, sentenced to 30 years in prison; appeal
in progress. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 




Pending before court. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
HCCR 21/08 Bernard Kibet Bii, 
Matthew Kipsang 





Withdrawn on July 24, 2008. 
Accused discharged after witnesses did not appear 
for two hearings. 
Incident clearly related to PEV.  




Kinyaga), and Dominic 
Mogaka Ondera 
Murder of James 
Kigen 
Withdrawn on July 31, 2008. 
No explanation for the unusual step of withdrawing 
a case mid-trial. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
HCCR 118/08 Peter Kepkemboi Murder of Kamau
Kimani Thiongo 
Pending before court. 
Court was scheduled to rule on prosecution case on 
November 25, 2011. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
96/08 Jackson Kibor Incitement to 
violence 
Withdrawn on April 6, 2009. 
Police failed to obtain audio evidence from BBC or 
witness testimony. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
536/08 Jane Kigen Juma and 
Philemon Kipchumba 
Robbery with violence
(causing death of one 
male victim) 
Withdrawn (Kigen Juma); acquitted (Kipchumba).
The Department of Public Prosecutions report 
erroneously lists as a murder case and claims it was 
pending before courts in 2010. However, it was 
closed in 2009. Human Rights Watch did not 
consult the file, but received information from a 
lawyer. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
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182/08 Daniel Moyi Makhopo 
and Dominic Malika 
Cheteri 
Robbery with violence Acquitted on July 20, 2011. 
Judge found identification of accused not strong 
enough, despite identification parade. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
7202/08 Paul Muigai Mwihia Gang rape Pending before court. 
Incident clearly related to PEV. 
4001/08 Peter Ochieng Grievous harm Convicted, 10 years. 
Court file not seen by Human Rights Watch; 
information from police sources. 





Defilement Convicted, sentenced to life imprisonment;
appealed. 
Nakuru Children’s Court subsequently lost the file 
for two years and the appeal stalled. Only after 
Human Rights Watch’s inquiry into the case was the 
file located. According to registry officials, the 
appeal will now proceed. 
Not related to PEV. 
1592/08 Margaret Wanjiru 
Mbugua 
Arson Withdrawn.
Witnesses never testified. 
Unclear whether incident was related to PEV. 
 
Sotik (Five court files researched) 
Case Number Accused Charge Outcome/Comments 
Unknown; police 
number provided 





Peter Chepkwony Robbery with violence Acquitted (according to the Department of Public 
Prosecutions report). 
Human Rights Watch sought file at Sotik 
Magistrate’s Court and was informed the case does 
not exist. 
8/08 Willy Kipngeno Rotich 
and seven others 
(also listed as Phillip 
Kipng'eno and 
Others) 
Robbery with violence Convicted.
Incident appears related to PEV. 
51/08 Bernard Muindi Arson Pending before court, according to the Department 
of Public Prosecutions report. 
File not seen by Human Rights Watch; Sotik court 
says it could not be found. 
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553/08 Jackson Kibet and 
three others 
Stealing Pending before court. 
Court file not seen by Human Rights Watch; 
information received by a lawyer. 
Unclear whether incident was related to PEV. 





locked motor vehicle 
Withdrawn in January 2010. 
Prosecution did not have a police file or any 
witnesses. 
Unclear whether incident was related to PEV. 
 
Webuye (Three court files researched) 







Defilement Convicted, sentenced to life imprisonment;
appealed. Outcome of appeal unknown. 







Defilement Convicted in October 2008, sentenced to life
imprisonment; appealed. Outcome of appeal 
unknown. 





Peter Ondu Mukhabui Rape Convicted, sentenced to 15 years; appealed.
Outcome of appeal unknown. 
Not related to PEV.  
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Appendix II: Letter to Commissioner Matthew Iteere 
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HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor
New York, NY 10118-3299
www.hrw.org
H U M A N  
R I G H T S  
W A T C H
Peter Omari Ogenche was shot in the back by
police in Kibera, Nairobi, during the post-election
violence. He is now paralyzed from the waist down
and suffers severe pain. Ogenche won a civil suit
against the government, but the government has
failed to pay the court-ordered compensation. 
© 2011 Noor Khamis
“Turning Pebbles”
Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya 
Four years after the onset of Kenya’s 2007-2008 post-election violence, the government has done little to ensure
justice for victims. It has failed to ensure the prosecution of perpetrators in all but a handful of the 1,133 or more
killings committed during the violence, which pitted ruling party supporters and the police against armed groups
linked with the opposition. Victims of rape, assault, arson, and other crimes similarly await justice. The
International Criminal Court has opened cases against six high-profile suspects, but hundreds of other
perpetrators of serious crimes continue to evade accountability.
This report, based on interviews with victims, police officers, defense and prosecution lawyers, and judicial
officials and analysis of 76 court files, documents the difficulties faced by election violence victims in obtaining
access to justice in Kenya. It identifies the principal weaknesses within the criminal justice system that have
contributed to the paltry number of convictions, including police officers’ unwillingness to investigate and
prosecute their colleagues; the generally poor quality of investigations; weaknesses within the police prosecution
system; political influence and corruption that subverts the judicial process; and the absence of an operative
witness protection system. 
Human Rights Watch calls on the government of Kenya to establish a special judicial mechanism within the
Kenyan justice system to investigate and prosecute the most serious election-related crimes. The government
should also urgently fund the Witness Protection Agency and fast-track reforms to improve the quality and the
independence of policing and prosecutions.
Providing redress for victims of post-election violence is a requirement, not an option. Nearly four years after the
violence, victims have been waiting for justice for far too long.
